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Abstract:  Between 1989 and 2003, low-income countries received $100 billion in debt 
relief.  The stated objectives for much of this debt relief have been to reduce debt 
overhang and to free up recipient government resources for development spending that 
would otherwise have been used for debt service.  In this paper we empirically assess 
the extent to which debt relief has been successful in meeting these objectives, using a 
newly-constructed database measuring the present value of debt relief for 62 low-
income countries.  We find little evidence that debt relief has affected the level and 
composition of public spending in recipient countries.  We also do not find evidence that 
debt relief has raised growth, investment rates or the quality of policies and institutions 
among recipient countries.   Although we cannot rule out the possibility that our failure to 
find evidence of positive impacts of debt relief is due to a variety of data and statistical 
problems, the evidence reported here does suggest that some skepticism is in order 
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" No civilised country should try to collect the debts of people that are dying of hunger 
and disease and poverty."   
--Jeffrey Sachs, quoted in the Financial Times, July 6, 2004 
 
 “The original focus of the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative was on 
removing the debt overhang and providing a permanent exit from rescheduling. Relief 
can also be used to free up resources for higher social spending aimed at poverty 
reduction to the extent that cash debt-service payments are reduced. These are now 
twin objectives” 
--World Bank and IMF Statement of Objective of Enhanced HIPC Initiative, 1999. 
 
 “The HIPCs’ unmanageable debt is a symptom of deeper structural problems. While the 
HIPC initiative appears likely to provide much-needed respite from high debt service, 
debt relief is not a panacea for broader economic development problems, nor is a one-
time debt reduction a guarantee that the problem will not re-emerge.” 
--World Bank Operations Evaluation Department Review of HIPC Initiative, 2003 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
  Between 1989 and 2003, low-income developing countries received $100 billion 
in debt relief in 2003 present value terms.  The arguments in favor of such substantial 
debt relief have ranged from the moral to the mundane.  The moral argument is that it 
simply is unjust for rich countries to try to collect on the debts owed to them by countries 
that are desperately poor.  This line of argument has featured prominently among 
advocates of debt relief, and is exemplified by the first quotation above.  Slightly over 
half of the $100 billion in debt relief has been granted in the context of the Highly-
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative organized by the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund.  Although in part a response to popular pressures for debt 
relief, the objectives of this initiative have been rather more mundane economic ones, as 
shown in the second quotation above.  They are to free up public resources for 
development spending that would otherwise have been devoted to debt service, and to 
eliminate a variety of disincentives for good public policy and private activity caused by 
high debt burdens that are collectively referred to as debt overhang. 
 
  The objective of this paper is to empirically assess how successful debt relief has 
been in meeting these objectives.  A practical difficulty facing such an exercise is that 
comprehensive data on debt relief among low-income countries does  not exist.   
Although debt relief under the HIPC initiative has been fairly well documented, data on   2
the very substantial amounts of pre-HIPC and non-HIPC debt relief is scarce and 
fragmented.  The first contribution of this paper is to provide a set of estimates of the 
present value of debt service reductions due to debt relief granted since 1989 when 
concessional reschedulings of low-income country debt began in earnest.  Our dataset 
covers 62 low-income countries including the 38 countries currently eligible for the HIPC 
initiative.  We provide two alternative estimates drawing on debtor-reported and creditor-
reported data respectively.  An important feature of these estimates is that they capture 
reductions in the present value of debt due to debt relief.  These can be very different 
from reported data on nominal amounts of debt forgiven which do not reflect cross-
country differences in the degree of concessionality of the debt eliminated, and also do 
not capture reductions in the present value of debt due to concessional reschedulings.   
 
  The second contribution of this paper is to use this new dataset on debt relief to 
empirically examine its impacts on outcomes of interest in the recipient countries.  We 
divide the 15-year period spanned by our data into three five-year periods, and examine 
the impact of debt relief on subsequent changes in several outcome variables suggested 
by the stated objectives of debt relief programs.  In particular we ask whether debt relief 
systematically affects the level and composition of public spending, consistent with the 
objective of debt relief to free up resources for public spending on development.  We 
also ask whether debt relief improves the incentives for good policy choices and for 
investment, as would be the case if debt relief reduces debt overhang problems.  We 
also ask whether there is any discernable impact of debt relief on per capita GDP growth 
as a crude way of summarizing the overall development impact of debt relief.  Our 
empirical strategy is akin to the standard "difference-in-difference" estimator familiar 
from the microeconometric literature on impact evaluation.  We ask whether countries 
receiving more debt relief over a given five-year period were more likely to see 
improvements in average outcomes in the next five-year period relative to the first.  As 
we discuss in more detail below, this strategy addresses a number of econometric 
concerns that arise from the fact that debt relief is not randomly assigned to countries 
but may be purposefully targeted to country characteristics, which in turn confounds the 
assessment of the effects of debt relief.   
 
  Our findings are not very supportive of the idea that debt relief has been 
successful in achieving these economic objectives.  We first look for evidence of a linear   3
relationship between debt relief and subsequent changes in five-year averages of 
outcome variables, and find little in the way of robustly significant effects.  We next 
consider the possibility that the true effects of debt relief on outcomes are nonlinear.  In 
particular, we hypothesize that debt relief is more likely to be effective in countries with 
good institutions and policies, and in countries where the debt forgiven was previously 
being serviced.  While these interaction effects appear to us to be plausible a priori, we 
do not find any evidence that they are empirically important in our sample of countries.  
Another possibility for the insignificance of debt relief is that debt relief is an imperfect 
proxy for changes in overall debt burdens, and that it is the latter that matter for 
outcomes.  However, we also do not find any evidence that reductions in total debt 
burdens from all sources, not just debt relief, are positively associated with outcomes.  
 
Despite its importance and prominence on the development agenda, there has been 
virtually no empirical work on the growth and development impacts of debt relief among 
low-income countries.
1  One exception is Easterly (2002), who suggests that the high 
debt burdens of HIPC countries reflect high discount rates, perhaps due to profligate 
governments, political instability, or interest group polarization.  He shows that among 
HIPC countries debt relief is positively correlated with new borrowing, and that HIPC 
countries tended on average to have worse policy performance than non-HIPC 
countries.  In contrast, HIPC countries were not likely to have experienced worse shocks 
than non-HIPC countries. He therefore argues that debt relief should be granted only to 
governments that display a fundamental shift in their development orientation.   Along 
similar lines, Arslanalp and Henry (2004) argue that the main problem of the countries 
receiving debt relief is their lack of good institutions rather than excessive debt burdens.  
They suggest that the modest improvement in the growth performance observed in 
these countries over the past few years may be due to the reforms that were required as 
a precondition for the granting of debt relief, and not to the alleviation of a debt overhang 
problem.  Both of these papers support the rather gloomy assessment of the HIPC 
initiative captured in the third quotation above:  that debt is a symptom rather than a 
cause of deeper development difficulties.  Although neither of these papers provides 
systematic empirical evidence on the impacts of debt relief as we do here, their 
                                                 
1 Much more work has been done on the impacts of debt relief in middle-income countries, particularly 
following the debt crisis of the 1980s.  See for example Arslanalp and Henry (2005) for a careful 
documentation of the positive impact of the Brady Plan.  There is also a literature on the effects of overall 
debt on growth, which we discuss in more detail later on in the paper.   4




The rest of this paper proceeds as follows.  In the next section we provide a brief 
discussion of the various channels through which debt relief may affect public finances 
and the incentives for good policy and investment.  In Section 3 of the paper we describe 
our new dataset on the present value of debt relief in low-income countries.  In Section 4 
we present some simple descriptive evidence regarding the relationship between debt 
relief and subsequent changes in outcomes.  In Section 5 we address concerns about 
endogeneity in the descriptive evidence and also look at the effects of changes in total 
debt on outcomes.  In Section 6 of the paper we focus on the more recent experience 
with debt relief under the HIPC initiative.  Section 7 concludes.  Three appendices 
provide details on our estimates of debt relief, a decomposition of changes in the present 
value of debt, and summary statistics on all of our variables. 
 
2.  Potential Effects of Debt Relief 
 
  Debt relief reduces the present value of the future debt service obligations of the 
recipient country.  Advocates of debt relief suggest that this can benefit the recipient 
country through its effects on public finances in the recipient country, and through 
improved incentives for public policy and private activity created by the removal of debt 
overhang. 
 
Effects on Public Finances 
 
  The most direct channel through which debt relief can affect development 
outcomes is through its effects on public spending.  For a given path of future tax and 
non-tax revenues such as foreign aid, debt relief permits an expansion in public 
spending by easing the government's intertemporal budget constraint.  In fact, a key 
feature of recent debt relief in the context of the enhanced HIPC initiative is that 
                                                 
2 Most of the empirical evidence in Easterly (2002) consists of documenting trends in outcome variables for 
the group of HIPC countries as a whole.  While this is useful descriptive analysis it does not provide a 
comparison with trends in countries not receiving debt relief nor does it relate changes in outcomes to 
amounts of debt relief received at the country level.  Arsanalp and Henry (2004) document that HIPC 
countries have poor institutional quality and report some comparisons of growth rates in HIPC and non-HIPC 
countries.   5
countries receiving debt relief are required to use the resources saved by debt relief to 
finance increased development spending, particularly in areas like health and 
education.
3  To the extent that public spending promotes development, this creates a 
channel from debt relief to development outcomes.  In this paper we do not attempt to 
provide evidence on the links between public spending and development outcomes, 
which is the subject of a large existing literature with mixed results.  Rather we treat 
increases in spending as an intended intermediate objective of debt relief.  We also note 
that debt relief need not result in an increase in public spending equal (in present value 
terms) to the reduction in future debt service.   Governments might choose to leave non-
debt service public spending unchanged and instead use the resources freed by debt 
relief to finance reductions in taxes and/or reductions in the rate of public debt 
accumulation. 
 
  The effect of debt relief on public spending also depends on what happens to 
foreign aid in response to debt relief.  Much of the debt of the low-income countries that 
we study is owed to official creditors that also provide foreign aid to these countries.  If 
foreign aid budgets are fixed, the donor's budget constraint implies that foreign aid must 
fall in response to debt relief.
4  If instead aid other than debt relief does not fall, then debt 
relief results in an increase in transfers from the creditor/donor country.  However, as 
discussed above these additional resources need not result in greater public spending 
but could finance lower taxes.  Given these potentially offsetting channels, the overall 
effect of debt relief on public spending, taxation, and foreign aid becomes an empirical 
question, which we address below. 
  
Debt Overhang Effects 
 
  Debt relief may also affect the recipient country by strengthening the incentives 
for recipient countries to choose good policies.  This might simply be due to 
requirements for better policy imposed by the creditor as a precondition to granting debt 
                                                 
3 An important consequence of this is that debt relief with this conditionality on spending attached does not 
improve the fiscal sustainability position of the recipient country.  Replacing one form of expenditure (debt 
service) with another (development spending) leaves the overall budget deficit and the rate of debt 
accumulation unchanged.  See Burnside and Fanizza (2004) for a discussion of this point. 
4 See Bird and Milne (2003) for a discussion of additionality.  Powell (2003) and Hepp (2004) provide 
empirical evidence that debt relief does not crowd out other forms of aid, which we discuss in more detail 
below.   6
relief.
5   More interestingly, improved policies may be an endogenous response on the 
part of the debtor.  In his classic model of debt overhang, Krugman (1988) shows that 
high debt service obligations reduce the incentive of debtors to engage in policy reforms 
that raise revenues available for debt service, since part of the additional revenues 
accrue to the creditor.  In the model, the resources available to the debtor to spend on 
debt service depend on effort -- interpreted as policy reforms that raise tax revenues -- 
and the realization of a shock.  Before the shock is realized, the debtor chooses effort to 
maximize its expected revenues after debt service payments, net of the disutility of 
effort.  The debtor thus chooses effort to equate the marginal disutility of effort with the 
marginal increase in revenues due to effort.  The latter is simply the probability that the 
country is able to fully service its debt, since the marginal unit of revenue accrues to the 
debtor only if debt is fully serviced.  Since the probability that debt is fully serviced 
increases as the amount of debt service due decreases, debt relief can raise the 
marginal benefit of effort and so result in the debtor choosing greater effort.  This can in 
turn also raise the expected value of debt service collected by the creditor. 
 
  It is difficult to asses a priori how relevant such incentive effects of debt relief are 
in low-income countries.  As we have noted most of these countries also receive very 
substantial aid flows from their creditors:  the median country in our sample pays 3 
percent of GDP in debt service but receives 12 percent of GDP in foreign aid every year.  
In the context of the Krugman model this suggests that the probability that debt is fully 
serviced should be equal to one, and so reductions in debt service cannot have positive 
incentive effects.
6  However, this argument overlooks the fact that much of aid is not 
provided as general budget support, but rather is earmarked to specific projects and/or 
to specific purchases from the donor country.  If foreign aid in these countries is not very 
fungible, then the receipt of even very substantial aid inflows need not significantly 
expand the country's resources available to pay its debt service obligations.
 7 
 
                                                 
5 As we discuss further below, a pre-condition for debt relief from the Paris Club group of creditors has been 
that recipient countries are in compliance with the demands of an IMF program.  Debt relief under the HIPC 
initiative requires establishment of a track record of good policies as judged by the World Bank. 
6 See Arsanalp and Henry (2004) for this argument. 
7 Feyzioglu, Swaroop and Zhu (1998) find in their core sample of 14 developing countries that aid increases 
public spending one-for-one, implying a total absence of fungibility for the total volume of aid.  Also, the 
presumption that foreign aid is fungible should be strongest in countries where aid finances only a small 
portion of public spending, which increases the possibility that governments can re-direct resources away 
from aid-financed interventions.  However, the countries that we study are highly aid-dependent.  The 
median country in our sample has 53 percent of public spending financed by aid.   7
  The fact that debt relief is conditioned on increases in development-related public 
spending provides a different reason to suppose that debt relief may not have strong 
incentive effects.  In the context of the Krugman model, suppose that the creditor 
provides debt relief, but at the same time requires that debt relief be spent on 
development projects.  In this case, debt relief does not raise the probability that debt 
can be serviced:  although it lowers the debt service obligation, it also lowers the 
recipient government's resources available for debt service.
8  As a result, debt relief no 
longer raises the marginal benefit of policy effort, and so does not induce greater effort 
on the part of the recipient.  These theoretical ambiguities regarding the incentive effects 
of debt relief suggest that the overall impact of debt relief on policy performance is an 
empirical question, which we consider below. 
 
  Debt relief which reduces the present value of public debt, can also in principle 
affect the incentives for private sector activity through various channels.  Debt relief 
could reduce both expected future taxes as well as uncertainty about future taxes.  If 
governments use the resources freed by debt relief to lower taxes, then debt relief can 
make investment more attractive.  Debt relief can also reduce the uncertainty about 
future tax burdens, for example by removing uncertainty about whether accumulated 
arrears will ever need to be repaid or not.  The uncertainty associated with future taxes 
need not refer only to the total amount of taxes to be collected. The distribution of the tax 
burden in societies with social and economic conflicts is subject to “negotiation” that 
increases uncertainty and lowers private investment.  
 
3.  Measuring Debt Relief 
 
  In this section of the paper we describe a new dataset of debt relief received by a 
sample of low-income countries.  Our objective is to estimate the change in the present 
value of the stock of debt outstanding due to debt relief on an annual basis.  The present 
value of debt at any point in time is defined as the present value of all future debt service 
payments associated with this debt.  Debt relief itself can consist of outright debt 
forgiveness as well as concessional debt restructurings.   Outright debt forgiveness 
reduces the present value of debt outstanding by eliminating the future debt service 
                                                 
8 We are assuming here that the recipient government does not value this mandatory spending on 
development projects.   8
obligations associated with the debt forgiven.  Concessional debt restructurings reduce 
the present value of debt by reducing and/or postponing future debt service obligations.   
 
Given the importance of debt relief in current policy discussions, it is somewhat 
surprising that no comprehensive dataset measuring the present value of debt relief 
exists.  As we discuss in more detail in Appendix A, data on debt relief provided by the 
World Bank and the OECD Development Assistance Committee in their major 
publications provides only imperfect information on the nominal amounts of debt 
forgiven.  There are two main drawbacks to this published data.  First, this data does not 
capture reductions in the present value of debt due to debt forgiveness, but only 
measures the face value of debt forgiven.  Forgiving a given nominal amount of highly 
concessional debt with a low present value of future debt service obligations should 
have a smaller impact on the recipient country than forgiving the same nominal amount 
of non-concessional debt.  This distinction is important because there is a great deal of 
variation across countries in the average concessionality of debt.  In our sample of low-
income countries, the median rate of concessionality of public- and publicly-guaranteed 
external debt (i.e. the ratio of the present value of debt to the face value of debt) is 70 
percent, and the 5th and 95th percentiles range from 47 to 95 percent.  The second 
drawback of these published sources is that they do not adequately capture changes in 
the present value of debt due to concessional reschedulings as opposed to outright debt 
forgiveness.  This is because reported data focuses on the flow reduction in debt service 
in a given year due to past reschedulings, rather than measuring the reduction in the 
present value of future debt service due to a rescheduling.  This issue is also important 
as we will see that concessional reschedulings have been significant for many countries 
and episodes.   
 
We develop two alternative estimates of debt relief following methodologies that are 
described in detail in Appendix A.  Our first method relies on debtor-reported data as 
presented in the World Bank's annual Global Development Finance publication.  We use 
published and unpublished data from this source to compile estimates of the nominal 
value of debt relief and reschedulings.  We combine this information with a new 
database on the present value of public external debt constructed by Dikhanov (2004) to 
arrive at estimates of changes in the present value of debt due to debt relief.  Our 
second method relies on creditor-reported data on debt relief from four main sources:    9
bilateral creditors operating through the Paris Club; multilateral creditors operating 
through the HIPC initiative; a small donor-funded debt-buyback facility for low-income 
countries operated by the World Bank; and bilateral debt relief provided by Russia.  For 
the first three of these sources we have fairly direct estimates of present value 
reductions due to debt relief, and for Russian debt relief we base our estimates on 
certain assumptions capturing the broad regularities of Russia's provision of debt relief. 
 
We are aware of only one other early effort to compile comprehensive estimates of 
debt relief in low-income countries.  Daseking and Powell (1999) provide estimates of 
the nominal amount of debt relief received by HIPC countries between 1988 and 1997.  
Our work differs from theirs in that we provide estimates of the present value of debt 
relief rather than the nominal amount.  As detailed in Appendix A, we are also able to 
better capture the effects of concessional reschedulings.  Our dataset also covers a 
larger sample of countries and for more years.  We cover a sample of 62 low-income 
countries with per capita GDP at PPP in 1996 below $3100, and provide data through 
2003.  We choose this somewhat arbitrary income threshold because it corresponds to 
the per capita income of the richest of the 38 countries currently eligible for HIPC 
assistance, Guyana.  Our sample therefore includes all the HIPC countries, as well as 
24 other low-income countries that are not eligible for HIPC relief for a variety of 
reasons.  Our full sample of countries is listed in Table 2 below. 
 
Description of Debt Relief Measures 
 
Table 1 and Table 2 report our two sets of estimates of the present value of debt 
relief for all of the low-income countries in our sample.  In Table 1 we report the annual 
time series of the total amount of debt relief granted to our sample of 62 low-income 
countries between 1989 and 2003.  Debt relief has been substantial, totalling between 
$34 billion and $42 billion dollars in 1988 present value terms, or between $109 billion 
and $134 billion in 2003 present value terms.
9  Figure 1 which plots the two estimates of 
total debt relief over time shows that annual flows of debt relief have increased over 
time, peaking around 2000 as large amounts of debt relief were granted to HIPC 
                                                 
9 Throughout the paper we use a constant discount rate of 7.25 percent.  This corresponds to the average 
value over our sample period of the OECD’s Commercial Interest Reference Rate (CIRR) for long-maturity 
US-dollar denominated liabilities.  CIRRs are routinely used by the donor community in estimating present 
values of debt and debt relief.   10
countries in this year, but declining somewhat afterwards.  Importantly for our purposes, 
pre-HIPC debt relief prior to 2000 has also been quite substantial, as most of the rest of 
the paper will be devoted to studying the impact of this pre-HIPC debt relief on 
subsequent outcomes.  Another reassuring feature of Figure 1 is that the two alternative 
estimates track each other fairly closely, although in some years the discrepancies 
between the two are substantial. 
 
The composition of the different sources of debt relief has also varied over time, as 
shown in Table 1.  In our Method 1 estimates drawing on debtor-reported data, debt 
relief due to rescheduling has remained fairly stable in the one- to two billion dollar range 
over our sample period.  Outright debt forgiveness has varied considerably more, with 
sharp peaks in the mid-1990s and in 2000 when substantial HIPC debt relief was 
delivered.  Our estimates for Method 2 drawing on creditor-reported data also show 
significant variation in the sources of debt relief.  Debt relief provided by Russia has 
been substantial only in a few years when very large amounts were granted to a 
relatively small number of debtors.  For example, virtually all of the $9 billion in debt 
relief granted by Russia in 2000 went to Vietnam.  Similarly almost all of Russian debt 
relief in 1996 and 1999 went to Nicaragua and Ethiopia, respectively.  Debt relief from 
multilateral creditors emerges only in 1998 as the first few countries in the HIPC process 
benefit from debt relief.  The bulk of multilateral debt relief was provided in 2000 as more 
countries qualified for relief under the Extended HIPC initiative which featured broader 
eligibility and weaker conditionality than the original HIPC initiative.   
 
In Table 2 we report the total present value of debt relief by country according to our 
two methods, expressed in dollar terms and as a share of the present value of the stock 
of public and publicly-guaranteed debt outstanding.  We do this for three five-year 
subperiods that we will use in our empirical analysis below, 1989-93, 1994-98, and 
1999-2003.  We obtain the total present value of debt relief for each sub-period by 
discounting our annual estimates of debt relief back to 1988, 1993, and 1998 
respectively.  Many of the countries in our sample have benefitted from quite substantial 
debt relief relative to their stock of debt outstanding.  Countries such as Bolivia, Guyana, 
Mozambique, Niger, and Senegal all were early beneficiaries of debt relief, with debt 
relief as a share of debt outstanding of more than 20 percent in the first period, 
according to our Method 1 estimates.  These levels of debt relief are comparable to   11
those observed in the most recent subperiod when debt relief under the HIPC initiative 
started to increase sharply.  The fact that many countries received substantial debt relief 
early in our sample period is important because it suggests that we will have sufficiently 
interesting variation in the data when we try to trace out the impact of debt relief over 
time. 
 
Figure 2 shows that our two estimates of debt relief are fairly highly correlated across 
countries.  To construct this figure we have discounted the annual flows of debt relief for 
the entire sample period 1989-2003 back to 1988, and expressed them as a fraction of 
the present value of total debt in 1988.   The simple correlation between our two 
estimates of debt relief is quite high at 0.82.  We note however that our Method 1 
estimates of debt relief are systematically larger than our Method 2 estimates.  The main 
reason for this is that our Method 2 estimates capture debt relief provided only by major 
creditor groups, whereas our Method 1 estimates are in principle comprehensive of all 
creditors as they rely on debtor-reported data covering all debt relief received.  Beyond 
this systematic difference, there are also non-trivial discrepancies between our two 
methodologies for some countries, suggesting that a significant amount of measurement 
error remains in our estimates of debt relief.  With this caveat in mind, we proceed to 




4.  Descriptive Evidence on Debt Relief and Outcomes 
 
  In this section of the paper we use the estimates of debt relief constructed in the 
previous section to provide some simple descriptive evidence on the relationship 
between debt relief and changes in a variety of outcomes of interest suggested by the 
theoretical discussion in Section 2 of the paper.  We first document the highly-reduced-
form relationship between debt relief and growth, and find no discernible effect of debt 
relief on growth.  We then examine some of the channels through which debt relief might 
operate.  We ask whether debt relief affects the level and composition of government 
spending and revenues.  We also ask whether there is any evidence that debt relief 
leads to better policies or improves incentives for investment.  Finally we look for but do   12
not find much evidence in support of two plausible (at least to us) nonlinearities in the 




  Our objective here is to provide some simple descriptive empirical evidence 
regarding the relationships suggested by the theory.  We do this by estimating a series 
of regressions of the form: 
 
(1)  it 1 it 1 0 1 it it DR X X ε + ⋅ β + β = − − −  
 
where Xit is an outcome variable of interest in country i in period t and DRit is one of our 
measures of debt relief.  We organize our data into three five-year periods, 1989-1993, 
1994-1998, and 1999-2003, and compute the outcome variables as averages over these 
periods.  We then regress the changes in the outcome variable on lagged debt relief, 
separately for the two cross-sections of changes observed in our panel of three 
quinquennial averages.  For example, we regress the change in the five-year average of 
the outcome variable between 1994-1998 and 1989-1993 on the cumulative amount of 
debt relief received during 1989-1993. 
 
  Our empirical strategy here corresponds to the standard "difference-in-
difference" estimator familiar from the microeconometric literature on impact evaluation.  
If we treat our debt relief variable as a binary indicator, we would be capturing the 
difference between the mean change in the outcome variable among countries receiving 
debt relief and the mean change among countries not receiving debt relief.  In our 
reported results we measure debt relief as a continuous variable.  We are therefore 
asking whether countries with large amounts of debt relief saw greater improvements in 
outcomes.  The main advantage of this simple descriptive exercise is that it relates debt 
relief to subsequent changes in outcome variables.   By focusing on changes in outcome 
variables we are removing any country-specific time-invariant determinants of outcome 
variables that might also correlated with debt relief.  For example, countries that are poor 
or are highly-indebted might tend to grow more slowly.  Since debt relief has been 
targeted to poor and highly-indebted countries, this would introduce a spurious negative 
correlation between debt relief and growth.  By looking at changes in outcome variables   13
we remove this potential source of bias.  There are however other potential econometric 
difficulties with Equation (1) which we address in the next section of the paper.  For now 
however we present the results of estimating Equation (1) in the spirit of simple, but 




  Table 3 summarizes our first set of results.  The rows of the table correspond to 
different outcome variables of interest.  The two sets of columns refer to the two sets of 
quinquennial changes in our dataset.  Within each set we report the estimated coefficient 
on debt relief using our two alternative estimates of debt relief.  We measure the debt 
relief variable as the present value of debt relief over the five-year period normalized by 
initial exports.  This is consistent with the common practice of measuring overall debt 
burdens relative to exports, and is exactly what we have reported in Table 2.  We have 
also estimated the regressions in Table 3 with three other variants:  debt relief as a 
share of initial GDP; debt relief as a share of total initial present value of debt 
outstanding; and an indicator variable taking the value of one if either of our two 
estimates of debt relief represents more than one percent of debt outstanding, and zero 
otherwise.   Results using these alternative normalizations for debt relief are very similar 
to those we find for debt relief relative to exports, and are not reported to conserve on 
space. 
 
  The first row of Table 3 gives our results for per capita GDP growth.   The 
correlations between debt relief and the subsequent change in five-year average growth 
are in most cases negative, although none of the estimated effects are statistically 
significant at conventional levels.  Our Method 2 estimate of debt relief comes closest to 
being significant in the first period, falling just short of the 10 percent level.  Figure 3 
plots the relationship between debt relief and changes in growth in the first and second 
periods, using our second measure of debt relief.  In our first sub-period, countries such 
as Niger and Senegal received substantial debt relief and saw increases in growth.  But 
at the same time countries such as Bolivia, Zambia and Mauritania all also received 
substantial debt relief but experienced stagnant or declining growth.  It is also clear from 
the top panel of Figure 3 that the marginal significance of debt relief for changes in   14
growth is largely due to one influential observation, Nicaragua.  When we drop this one 
observation the t-statistic on debt relief falls to 1.04. 
 
  We next turn to a set of variables intended to capture the effects of debt relief on 
public finance.  As we have discussed above, one of the purposes of debt relief has 
been to make resources available to governments to spend on development objectives.  
We therefore begin by asking what is the relationship between debt relief and 
government spending.  We obtain data on the latter from Gupta, Clements, and 
Tiongson (1998), who compile data on total central government expenditures and its 
functional breakdown from IMF country reports.
10   Their total government spending 
variable conventionally includes interest expenditures, but not amortization of principal.  
To the extent that debt relief results in a reduction in interest payments, this could by 
construction create a spurious negative relationship between changes in measured 
government spending and debt relief.  We therefore subtract from total government 
spending interest payments on public and publicly-guaranteed debt as reported in the 
GDF.   
 
  Our results for government spending as a share of GDP are in the second row of 
Table 3.  Here we fail to find any significant relationship between the change in 
government spending and debt relief.  The coefficients vary in sign from one 
specification to the next, and the t-statistics are all very small.  The top panel of Figure 4 
plots one representative correlation between our Method 2 of debt relief and the change 
in government spending as a share of GDP in the first period.  It is striking that only a 
handful of the countries with positive debt relief in the initial period saw increases in 
government spending, for example Ethiopia, Bolivia, and Nicaragua.  Most of the other 
countries that received debt relief saw declines, rather than increases, in government 
spending.  
 
  Our data on government spending also allows us to separately identify 
government spending on health and education.  Expenditures in these areas are often 
thought of as having disproportionately large development benefits, and countries 
                                                 
10 We are grateful to Benedict Clements and Shamsuddin Tarek for kindly making an updated version of this 
dataset available to us.  One of the main advantages of this dataset is that it has much greater country 
coverage than standard published sources such as the IMF's Government Finance Statistics Yearbook.  
Nevertheless, our country coverage for this variable is substantially less than for GDP growth, with only 35 
and 44 observations in the two sub-periods, as compared with 46 and 54 for growth.   15
benefiting from HIPC debt relief are expected to increase spending in these areas.  We 
therefore also ask whether spending on health and education as a share of total 
spending increases faster in countries that receive more debt relief.  The results are 
reported in the third row of Table 3.  In the first period, we find no significant effect 
whatsoever.  However, in the second period we find quite strong evidence that spending 
on health and education increases as a share of total spending.  An increase in debt 
relief relative to exports of 0.5 (which is roughly one standard deviation of this variable) 
would raise health and education spending as a share of total spending by about two 
percentage points.  The bottom panel of Figure 4 shows the simple correlation between 
the change in health and education spending and initial debt relief in the second period, 
using our first measure of debt relief.  Two countries, Mozambique and Yemen, are quite 
influential observations, with large amounts of debt relief between 1994 and 1998, and 
with a very sharp jumps of 14 and 9 percentage points in the share of health and 
education spending, respectively.  Dropping these two observations eliminates the 
statistical significance of the correlation between debt relief and the share of health and 
education spending.  It is also interesting to note that many of the countries showing 
large increases in health and education spending shares are countries that received 
substantial debt relief under the HIPC initiative after 2000, for example Cameroon, 
Tanzania, and Guyana.  We are therefore reluctant to credit debt relief during 1994-98 
as being responsible for the subsequent increase in health and education spending in 
these countries, as it may instead reflect conditionalities associated with HIPC debt relief 
that came later.   
 
  As we discussed above, one possible reason why government spending might 
not increase in response to debt relief is that governments instead use the fiscal space 
created by debt relief to lower taxes.  We therefore next ask whether there is any 
evidence that tax revenues collected as a share of GDP decline in response to debt 
relief.  Our tax variable measures total tax revenue, and is taken from Baumsgaard and 
Keen (2005), who have constructed a database on tax revenues disaggregated by type, 
drawing on IMF country reports.
11  As with the expenditure data described earlier, this 
dataset offers substantially greater country coverage than standard published sources.  
We report results for this variable in the fourth row of Table 3.    Our point estimates are 
in all cases positive, suggesting that if anything debt relief leads to subsequent increases 
                                                 
11 We are grateful to Michael Keen and Thomas Baunsgaard for kindly making their dataset available to us.   16
in taxes rather than reductions in taxes, and in one case this finding is weakly significant 
at the 10 percent level.  This case is shown in the top panel of Figure 5 which plots our 
second measure of debt relief in the first period and the subsequent change in tax 
revenues relative to GDP.   
 
  Another possible reason why government spending does not appear to change 
much in response to debt relief is that donors providing debt relief to a country might 
reduce other forms of aid to the same country.  We investigate this in the fifth row of 
Table 3.  Our dependent variable is net official development assistance (ODA) as a 
share of GDP, as reported by the OECD.
12  In all cases we find that countries receiving 
more debt relief are more likely to see a subsequent decline in aid inflows.  However, 
this finding is significant at the 10 percent level only for the second measure of debt 
relief, in the first period.  The bottom panel of Figure 5 shows the simple scatter plot 
between debt relief and subsequent changes in aid relative to GDP.  It is clear from this 
figure that one country, Nicaragua, is quite influential, with large debt relief in the first 
period, and a sharp decline in aid relative to GDP.  Excluding this one observation 
eliminates even the marginal significance of this result.   Our results for this variable are 
consistent with other work that has looked at the extent to which debt relief is "additional" 
in the sense of not crowding out other forms of aid.  Powell (2003) finds no significant 
correlation between aid and debt relief, although using a different measure of debt relief 
and different assumptions regarding the timing of effects. Hepp (2004) reaches the same 
conclusions, with HIPC countries receiving higher net transfers than non-HIPC countries. 
 
  We next consider the possibility that debt relief mitigates debt overhang, and thus 
should be followed by improvements in policy performance and increases in investment.  
We use two measures of policy performance.  We first use the World Bank's Country 
Policy and Institutional Assessment ratings that have been prepared by World Bank 
country economists on an annual basis since 1977.  Countries are rated according to a 
                                                 
12 Data on net ODA for the most part do not reflect aid provided as debt relief.  This is because OECD 
reporting standards require donor countries to report the value of debts cancelled in a given year as gross 
ODA inflows to the recipient, but then an offsetting cancelling entry is made in outflows so that net ODA 
does not capture debt forgiveness.  Debt rescheduling is reported in a way similar to the GDF.  That is, the 
reduction in debt service payments in a given year due to debt relief is supposed to be reported as an inflow 
to the recipient with no cancelling outflow.  As a result net ODA does capture debt reschedulings.   
Unfortunately however the OECD does not report these rescheduling flows by recipient country so we are 
unable to adjust the ODA data for this part of debt relief.  See 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/36/32/31723929.htm#TableDAC2a for details on OECD aid reporting 
requirements.   17
range of criteria capturing different dimensions of the institutional and policy environment 
and a summary score on a scale from one to six is produced.
13  We find a fairly strong 
positive relationship between debt relief 1989-1993 and the subsequent quinquennial 
change in CPIA scores.  However, this positive correlation is not present in the second 
period.  Upon closer inspection however the finding that policy improves following debt 
relief does not appear to be so strong.  The top panel of Figure 6 plots the simple 
correlation between our second measure of debt relief and the subsequent change in 
policy.  Three observations are quite influential.  The two in the bottom-left corner of the 
graph are Rwanda and Burundi, which both received no debt relief in the first period, and 
their CPIA scores fell sharply as these countries fell into civil conflict in the mid-1990s.  
In contrast Nicaragua in the top-right corner received very substantial debt relief and saw 
sharp improvements in its CPIA scores as that country emerged from its civil conflict of 
the 1980s.  Excluding these observations sharply reduces the magnitude and 
significance of the effect of debt relief on policy, although it just remains significant at the 
five percent level.  We have also looked at the link between debt relief and policy using 
an publicly-available assessment of institutional quality, the widely-used ICRG 
composite index.  Here we find a positive correlation between debt relief and subsequent 
changes in the ICRG index, that are for the most part not statistically significant.   
 
  As another measure of policy performance, we consider the share of trade taxes 
in total taxes, again taken from Baumsgaard and Keen (2005).  Since trade taxes are 
typically fairly easy to collect, a decline in this ratio can be used as a rough proxy for a 
country's success in expanding its tax base.
14  These results are reported in the second-
last row of Table 3.  In the first period we do find a negative relationship and marginally 
significant relationship at the 10 percent level, with the share of trade taxes falling faster 
on average in countries receiving more debt relief.  The bottom panel of Figure 6 shows 
this relationship, for the second measure of debt relief in the first period.  While the 
negative correlation is apparent, it is also clear that just two countries, Benin and 
Uganda, are quite influential, with both receiving substantial debt relief and both seeing 
large declines in trade taxes as a share of total taxes.  Dropping these two observations 
again eliminates even the marginal significance of this finding. 
                                                 
13 For details on the CPIA assessments visit 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IDA/Resources/CPIA2004questionnaire.pdf. 
14 There clearly are several difficulties with such a proxy.  Notably, in commodity-dependent countries this 
share tends to depend heavily on fluctuations in commodity prices.   18
 
  Finally, we examine whether there is any evidence that private sector activity 
expands in response to debt relief.  In our theoretical discussion above we noted that 
debt relief could improve incentives for investment, particularly if countries used the 
fiscal space created by debt relief to lower taxes.   Ideally we would want to look at how 
private investment responds to debt relief, but reliable data on private investment for our 
sample of low-income countries does not exist.  We therefore look at total investment as 
a share of GDP as an imperfect proxy.  The results can be found in the last row of Table 
3, where we fail to find any significant impact of debt relief on investment.  This is 
consistent with our earlier finding that debt relief does not seem to significantly impact 
tax collection, and if anything the sign of the effect on taxes is positive. 
 
Are nonlinearities important? 
 
  Thus far we have provided descriptive evidence regarding linear relationships 
between debt relief and changes in outcomes.  A possible reason for our failure to find 
much in the way of a significant effect is that the true effects are nonlinear.  One 
argument is that debt relief will only have positive effects on outcomes in countries with 
good policies and institutions.  This argument is a natural one to consider since debt 
relief is in some ways similar to foreign aid, and there is some evidence that the effects 
of foreign aid on growth depend on the quality of policies and institutions.
15  Another 
possibility is that debt relief matters for outcomes only if the debt is actually being 
serviced.  If in contrast the debt is not being serviced but is simply accumulating arrears, 
then forgiving this debt will not provide additional resources to the debtor country but 
simply amounts to cleaning up the books of the creditor.   
 
  In order to capture these possible nonlinearities, we consider two sets of 
regressions following those in Table 3, but adding interaction terms.  To capture the 
differential effect of debt relief in countries with good policy, we introduce the interaction 
of debt relief with a dummy variable that identifies countries with a CPIA score greater 
than 3.4, corresponding to the median of our sample.  To capture the differential effect of 
                                                 
15 See for example Burnside and Dollar (2000, 2004).  This evidence has been criticized by Easterly, Levine 
and Roodman (2004) and Rajan and Subramanian (2005).  The idea that aid is more effective in a good 
policy environment remains one that is a priori sensible, and is supported by evidence on the success of 
individual projects (see for example Isham, Kaufmann and Pritchett (1997) and Isham and Kaufmann 
(1999)).   19
debt relief in countries where debt is being serviced, we construct a similar interaction 
that identifies countries where arrears as a share of debt outstanding fall below the 
median of our sample, which is 5 percent.  The previous discussion suggests that these 
two interaction terms should enter positively. 
 
  We report the results of including these interactions in Table 4.  The two panels 
of Table 4 correspond to these two sets of interactions.  Within each panel we consider 
the same list of outcome variables as before.  We report in the columns the coefficient 
estimates on the linear term in debt relief, and the interaction term, for the two measures 
of debt relief and the two sets of changes over time.  The overall impression from this 
table is that these a priori plausible interaction terms are not very significant.  In only two 
cases we do find a statistically significant interactive effect.  For investment, the 
interaction with arrears in the second period is significantly positive, consistent with our 
priors that the impact of debt relief is greater in countries where initial arrears were low.  
For policy, we find a counterintuitive negative interaction, suggesting that debt relief is 
more likely to lead to declines in policies when policy performance is initially good.  We 
do not want to assign too much importance to these two cases however as they are just 
two of 56 possible interactions reported in the table, and we would expect one or two to 
be significant at the 5 percent level purely by chance.   In most cases we do however 
find that the few cases where direct effects of debt relief were significant in Table 3 
continue to be significant here with the addition of interaction terms.  As we have 
discussed above, though, many of these significant direct effects are not particularly 
robust and are often driven by a few very influential observations.  In summary, we do 
not find much evidence that these interaction effects are important. 
 
  Overall, the simple descriptive evidence in this section provides very little support 
for the idea that debt relief matters for outcomes through the channels we have 
discussed above.  We find very little in the way of significant correlations between debt 
relief and subsequent changes in growth, investment, total government spending, and 
tax collection.  We do find some modest evidence that debt relief improves policy 
performance, but only in the first period, and some weak evidence that debt relief is 
followed by increases in the share of public spending going to health and education.  
Often even these modestly significant results are driven by a few influential   20
observations.  Taken together, our first look at the data does not provide much support 
for the idea that debt relief has been effective in achieving its stated objectives.  
 
5.  Endogeneity and the Role of Overall Indebtedness 
 
  In this section of the paper we generalize the empirical specification of the 
previous section in order to address two shortcomings.  The first one is econometric.  
We show that if debt relief is correlated with contemporaneous shocks to the levels of 
our outcome variables the simple difference-in-difference estimator used above will be 
biased.  The second problem is that we have so far ignored changes in debt due to 




  We begin by noting that the theoretical discussion in Section 2 suggests that 
there is a relationship between levels of outcome variables and levels of indebtedness.  
For example, high debt levels relative to exports imply high debt service obligations, 
which in turn constrain government spending as a share of GDP and/or weaken 
incentives for good policy.  Since the theory does not provide us with very precise 
empirical specifications to test, we instead attempt to crudely capture this idea with the 
following parsimonious linear specification for the levels of our outcome variables: 
 
(2)  it i t 1 it 1 it it D X X ε + μ + λ + ⋅ β + ⋅ ρ = − −  
  
where as before Xit is the outcome variable of interest in country i in period t.  Dit-1 is the 
stock of debt at the end of the previous period; λt and μi are unobserved period- and 
country-specific effects; and εit is an idiosyncratic shock.  Since many of our outcome 
variables exhibit significant persistence over time in levels, we have also included an 
autoregressive term in Equation (2).  This means that we can capture the observed 
persistence in outcome variables with some combination of country fixed effects as well 
as an autoregressive component.  As before we organize our data into three five-year 
periods, 1989-1993, 1994-1998, and 1999-2003, and compute the outcome variables as 
averages over these periods.  We measure the stock of debt as the present value of   21
public and publicly-guaranteed debt relative to exports, as of the end of the previous 
period, i.e. in end-1988, 1993, and 1998.   
 
  First-differencing this equation in order to eliminate unobserved country-specific 
effects that might be correlated with debt results in: 
 
(3)  () ( ) 1 it it 1 t t 2 it 1 it 2 it 1 it 1 it it D D X X X X − − − − − − − ε − ε + λ − λ + − ⋅ β + − ⋅ ρ = −  
 
where we now have the change in the outcome variable regressed on its lagged change, 
and the lagged change in the present value of debt as a share of exports.  We show in 
Appendix B that the change in this debt ratio can be decomposed into two terms, i.e. 
1 it 1 it 2 it 1 it Z DR D D − − − − + = − .  The first, DRit-1 is the contribution of debt relief to changes in 
the present value of debt as a share of exports during period t-1.  This is simply the 
present value of all debt relief received during period t-1 expressed as a share of initial 
exports, and is the same measure of debt relief that we used in the previous section.  
The second, Zit-1, captures all other sources of changes in the present value of debt 
relative to exports during period t-1, including net new borrowing, fluctuations in the 
denominator of the debt ratio, and cross-currency valuation changes.   
 
  We next substitute this decomposition of the change in total debt into Equation 
(3), and we allow the slope coefficients on the two terms to differ in order to capture the 
possibility that debt reductions due to debt relief have a different impact on outcomes 
than debt reductions due to other factors, possibly because of policy conditionality 
associated with debt relief.  This results in: 
 
(4)  () 1 it it 1 t t 1 it 2 1 it 1 2 it 1 it 1 it it Z DR X X X X − − − − − − − ε − ε + λ − λ + ⋅ β + ⋅ β + − ⋅ ρ = −  
 
Equation (4) is a natural generalization of the simple difference-in-difference 
specification in Equation (1) that we used in the previous section.  In particular, in the 
previous section we were implicitly assuming that there was no autoregressive 
component in outcomes, i.e. ρ=0, and we also treated changes in debt burdens due to 
factors other than debt relief, Zit-1,  as part of the error term. These simplifying   22
assumptions delivered Equation (1), which we estimated for our two cross-sections of 
changes.  
 
  Equation (4) illustrates two potential econometric difficulties with the simple 
descriptive evidence in the previous section.  Note first that the error term in Equation (4) 
includes the shock to the lagged outcome variable, εit-1.  It seems plausible that debt 
relief during period t-1 might be targetted towards realizations of this shock.  Concretely, 
suppose that the outcome variable of interest is policy, and suppose that during our first 
five-year period 1989-1993 a country exhibits better-than-expected policy, i.e. there is a 
positive realization of εit-1.  Thanks to this strong policy performance, the country might 
be rewarded with more debt relief.  This creates a positive correlation between debt 
relief during period t-1 and shocks to policy.  This in turn creates a negative correlation 
between debt relief and the error term in Equation (4), since higher realizations of policy 
in the first period make it more likely that the change in policy is smaller between 1989-
1993 and the next five year period 1994-1998.  This suggests that our simple OLS 
estimates of Equation (1) will be biased downwards.  Of course, the bias could go the 
other way for other outcome variables.  For example, countries with negative shocks to 
growth during period t-1 might receive more debt relief if donors provide debt relief as a 
form of aid.  In this case our OLS estimates of Equation (1) would be biased upwards. 
  
  The second problem is closely related to the first.  If outcome variables have a 
strong autoregressive component, i.e. ρ>0, then changes in outcomes will be positively 
correlated with lagged changes in outcomes.  For example, the change in policy 
between 1989-1993 and the next five year period 1994-1998 will be correlated with the 
change in policy between 1984-1988 and 1989-1993.  If debt relief during 1989-1993 is 
correlated with this lagged change in policy, then we have a standard omitted variable 
bias problem.  The direction of this bias can again go either way.  If countries that 
showed an improvement in policy between 1984-1988 and 1989-1993 got more debt 
relief during 1989-1993, then our the simple OLS estimate of the impact of debt relief on 
the subsequent change in policy will be biased up.  If in contrast growth is positively 
correlated over time and countries with declines in average growth performance 
between 1984-1988 and 1989-1993 received more debt relief, then we would have a 
downward bias in our OLS estimates.   
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  We address these two econometric difficulties by adding the lagged change in 
the outcome variable to our simple descriptive regression to address the omitted variable 
problem, and by using internal instruments to deal with endogeneity.   Note that we need 
instruments for both debt relief (for the reasons given above) as well as for the lagged 
change in the outcome variable.  This is because the latter is by construction correlated 
with the error term in Equation (4) since Xit-1 depends on εit-1.  Our identifying 
assumptions are as follows:  (1) the stock of debt at the end of period t-1 is uncorrelated 
with subsequent shocks to outcomes, i.e.  [ ] 0 D E s it 1 it = ε ⋅ + −  for s>1,2,3...; and (2) the 
shocks to outcomes are uncorrelated over time, i.e.  [ ] 0 E s it it = ε ⋅ ε +  for s=±1,±2,±3....   
These identifying assumptions imply that the necessary exclusion restrictions will be 
satisfied if we use Xit-2 as an instrument for Xit-1 -Xit-2, and Dit-2 as an instrument for DRit-1.  
We think these identifying assumptions are not too implausible.  Barring very strong 
forward-looking behavior on the part of governments it seems reasonable to assume that 
the stock of public external debt as a share of exports at a given point in time is not 
affected by subsequent shocks to outcomes.  The assumption of no serial correlation in 
the error terms also seems reasonable given that we have captured the serial 
dependence in the outcome variables by both country fixed effects as well as an 
autoregressive term.  There is also reason to believe that these instruments are relevant 
in the sense of having predictive power for the endogenous variables.  If outcomes have 
an autoregressive component with ρ<1 then the twice-lagged level of the outcome 
variable Xit-2 will be correlated with the subsequent change in outcomes, Xit-1 -Xit-2.  And it 
also seems reasonable to expect that countries with high debt burdens are more likely to 
receive debt relief.  
 
  Equations (3) and (4) also illustrate a more conceptual problem with the simple 
descriptive evidence of the previous section.  In this simple descriptive evidence we 
have not allowed for the possibility that changes in debt due to factors other than debt 
relief might matter for changes in outcomes.  While this is consistent with the focus on 
this paper on the effects of debt relief, at least some of the theoretical discussion in 
Section 2 suggests that changes in debt from other sources might matter for outcomes 
as well.  For example, in the Krugman model of debt overhang, any shock which 
reduces the stock of debt and the associated debt service burden will create incentives 
for good policy by raising the probability that debt will be fully serviced.  For this reason   24
we also provide estimates of Equation (3) where we explain changes in outcomes with 
changes in overall debt, rather than just debt relief.  In Appendix B we also show that the 
changes in the present value of debt relative to exports over the three five-year periods 
in our dataset are rather weakly correlated with debt relief.  This raises the possibility 
that our failure to find significant effects of debt relief has simply been due to the fact that 




  We begin by estimating Equation (4) in which we explain changes in outcome 
variables with debt relief alone, i.e. we impose the restriction that β2=0.    The results are 
reported in Table 5, where we have also imposed the restriction ρ=0.  The only 
difference therefore between these results and the ones in Table 3 are that we are using 
the twice-lagged level of the present value of debt relative to exports as an instrument 
for lagged debt relief.  Because not all of our countries have data on this instrument in 
1983 and 1988, our sample of observations is somewhat smaller than before.  The rows 
of the table correspond to the same set of outcome variables.  At the bottom of the table 
we report the first-stage regressions for the two sets of changes and the two measures 
of debt relief.  These first-stage regressions perform reasonably well in three of the four 
cases, with F-statistics ranging from 7.3 to 8.9.  Not surprisingly, prior debt stocks are 
significantly positively correlated with subsequent debt relief, except in the case of our 
Method 1 debt relief in the second period.
16  Our instrumental variables estimates of the 
impact of debt relief turn up only two marginally significant coefficients out of the 28 
specifications in Table 5.  The marginally significant negative impact of debt relief on aid 
that we also saw in Table 3 remains after we instrument, as does the negative estimated 
impact of debt relief on the share of trade taxes in total taxes.  Overall, the evidence in 
this table is once again not very supportive of the idea that debt relief has significant 
effects on outcomes. 
 
  Although the estimated coefficients are not very significant, it is nevertheless 
interesting to compare the magnitude of the uninstrumented and instrumented coefficient 
                                                 
16 The first-stage regressions are of course slightly different for each of the outcome variables as the sample 
of countries differs depending on data availability.  We report only the first-stage regressions for the largest 
possible sample to conserve space.   25
estimates, since this provides information about the direction of the underlying 
endogeneity bias.  In the case of government spending, tax revenues, and investment, 
the IV estimates are consistently bigger than the OLS estimates.  This pattern suggests 
that donors provide debt relief to countries with experiencing large positive shocks to 
these variables, so that the OLS estimates are biased downwards.  In contrast, the IV 
estimates are consistently smaller than the OLS estimates for aid as a share of GDP.  
This suggests that countries with negative shocks to aid are in part compensated by 
receiving more debt relief.  
 
  We have also tried to estimate Equation (4) relaxing the restriction that ρ=0.  This 
effort runs into two practical difficulties.  The first is that we need data on our outcome 
variables between 1983 and 1988 in order to construct the lagged change in outcomes.  
For several of our outcome variables, notably the taxation and spending variables, data 
is quite sparse during the mid-1980s and this drastically reduces our sample size.  The 
second problem we encounter is one of weak instruments.  In the regressions with ρ≠0, 
we have two endogenous variables (debt relief and the lagged change in the outcome 
variable) and two candidate instruments (twice-lagged debt and twice-lagged levels of 
the outcome variables).  While we have seen that twice-lagged debt predicts debt relief 
fairly well, we often find that twice-lagged levels of outcomes are poor predictors of 
subsequent changes in outcomes.  The combination of weak instruments and a very 
small sample size means that our IV estimator is virtually uninformative.  We often find 
very large standard errors as well as wildly implausible point estimates of the coefficients 
on the lagged change in the outcome variable.  For this reason we do not report these 
results here.   We do note however that in virtually all cases we do not reject the null 
hypothesis that ρ=0, albeit with very low power.  This would account for the poor 
performance of our instrument for lagged changes in outcomes, and it also justifies 
focusing on the results without the lagged change in outcomes that are reported in Table 
5. 
 
  We finally turn to the possibility that changes in overall debt burdens rather than 
just debt relief are what matter for changes in outcomes.  Our estimates of Equation (3) 
are reported in Table 6.    We report both simple OLS estimates in order to facilitate 
comparison with the descriptive evidence in Table 3, as well as IV estimates.  For the 
latter we use the twice-lagged level of debt as an instrument for its lagged change.  For   26
the same reasons given above, we are forced to impose the restriction that ρ=0, as we 
encounter the same severe weak instruments problems when we try to include, and 
instrument for, the lagged change in the outcome variable.  The OLS estimates show a 
few significant correlations between changes in debt and changes in subsequent 
outcomes.  There is a significant positive correlation between changes in debt and 
subsequent changes in growth, and there is a significant negative correlation with 
changes in government spending in the first subperiod.  The latter result is consistent 
with the idea that high debt service crowds out government spending.  We also see a 
positive and significant correlation between changes in debt and changes in trade taxes 
as a share of total taxes.  This can be interpreted as support for the idea that higher debt 
burdens lead to worse policy.  None of these findings remain significant when we 
instrument for changes in debt to control for possible correlations between changes in 
debt and shocks to outcomes.  We also note that this loss of significance cannot simply 
be ascribed to the lower precision of the IV estimator.  Although our sample size is quite 
small, our first-stage regressions deliver fairly respectable F-statistics of 6.3 and 8.3.
17   
 
  Our failure to find a significant negative effect of changes in debt on growth is of 
particular interest in light of several recent papers that have empirically investigated the 
impact of debt on growth using cross-country regressions.
18  Three recent papers argue 
that there are nonlinearities in the relationship between debt and growth, although they 
disagree as to the shape of the nonlinearity.  Patillo, Poirson and Ricci (2002) using a 
panel of 93 developing countries find that the marginal impact of debt on growth is 
positive for approximately the least-indebted 10 percent of their sample, but is negative 
for the remaining 90 percent of the sample.
19  Imbs and Ranciere (2005) use more 
flexible kernel regressions and find that the relationship between debt and growth is 
negative only in the most highly-indebted part of their sample.  Finally Cordella, Ricci 
and Ruiz-Arranz (2005) argue for a zone of "debt irrelevance" in which the impact of 
debt on growth is nil when debt burdens are very high but negative over an intermediate 
range.  All of these papers use estimators that rely on the within-country variation in debt 
                                                 
17 For the regressions in Table 6 we have restricted the sample to exclude a handful of observations where 
the absolute change in the present value of debt as a share of exports was greater than 200%.  Including 
these observations resulted in very poor explanatory power for our first-stage regressions. 
18 A few papers have also looked at the impact of debt on investment.  Cohen (1993) finds that are debt 
payments, and not the level of debt, what have an impact in the investment rate for 81 developing countries 
over the period 1965-1987. Hansen (2004) also finds a negative effect of debt services on investment. 
19 The contribution of Clements, Bhattacharya and Nguyen (2004) is closely related to this paper, using 
similar data and methodology.  They also document a negative impact of debt service on public investment.   27
and growth rates, and therefore are comparable to our results which examine the partial 
correlation between changes in debt and subsequent changes in growth. 
 
  We do not find the results of these three papers fully persuasive however.  One 
difficulty with the first and third papers has to do with timing:  they examine the 
contemporaneous relationship between debt and growth over three-year periods.  This 
raises the possibility that the negative correlation between debt and growth is driven by 
shocks to growth rather than debt.  Imbs and Ranciere (2005) show that when one 
switches to the relationship between initial debt and subsequent growth, the partial 
correlation between the two is mostly insignificant.  Imbs and Ranciere (2005) also show 
that the estimated effect of debt on growth becomes insignificant when proxies for the 
institutional environment are included in the regression, consistent with the view that 
countries with weak institutions are more likely to overaccumulate debt and also 
experience slower growth.
20   
 
Based on our results as well as our interpretation of the existing literature, we do not 
think there is a great deal of evidence that total debt stocks matter for growth, at least  in 
the low-income countries that have been beneficiaries of substantial debt relief over the 
past 15 years that we have studied.  While debt relief has been only imperfectly 
correlated with changes in overall debt, this is unlikely to be the reason why debt relief 
has had so little development impact.  Rather, our results suggest that changes in debt 
from any source are not significantly correlated with changes in growth or improvements 
in our other outcome variables. 
 
 
6.  Has Recent Debt Relief Been More Effective? 
 
  One drawback of the empirical strategy that we have pursued in the previous two 
sections is that we have not been able to study the impact of debt relief during the last 
five-year period for which we have data, 1999-2003.  This is because we have been 
relating debt relief to subsequent changes in outcomes over the following five-year 
                                                 
20 This latter finding is closely related to Presbitero (2005) who argues that existing evidence on the 
nonlinear relationship between debt and growth is not robust.  He instead finds that high debt levels 
contribute to macroeconomic instability, suggesting that debt relief can improve growth by reducing 
instability.    28
period.  However, we do not yet have available five years of data following 2003 so we 
cannot implement this strategy for debt relief in our last five-year period.  This is 
unfortunate because both of our measures of debt relief show substantial increases in 
the volume of debt relief during the most recent period, mostly reflecting the delivery of 
substantial debt relief under the HIPC initiative.   
 
  In this part of the paper we look at the relationship between debt relief and 
changes in outcomes within our last five-year period 1999-2003 in order to remedy this 
gap.  To compute average changes in outcomes within the last period, we regress each 
outcome variable on a time trend and retrieve the slope coefficient for each country.  We 
then estimate a series of regressions of these trend changes in the outcome variable on 
our cumulative measure of debt relief during the period.  We recognize that by doing so 
we are subject to much greater potential endogeneity biases due to the targetting of debt 
relief to changes in outcomes, and we therefore interpret these results with greater 
caution.   
 
  We report the results for this exercise in Table 7.  The rows correspond to the 
same set of outcome variables we have considered in previous tables.
21  The results are 
broadly consistent with our previous findings, in the sense that we find very little 
evidence of significantly higher rates of improvement in outcomes among countries 
receiving greater debt relief.  There are a few noteworthy exceptions to this.  In contrast 
with our results for earlier periods, we do not see much evidence of sharp upwards 
trends in health and education expenditures as a share of total spending within the last 
period.  This is somewhat troubling as much of the debt relief we consider during this 
period was delivered under the HIPC initiative, where one of the stated objectives was to 
use the resources saved via debt relief to finance higher spending in these areas.   We 
also see very little evidence of policy improvements within the last period.  This may 
however be because countries receiving HIPC relief were required to show 
improvements in policy prior to receiving debt relief.  One piece of modestly good news 
in these results is that the correlation between debt relief and increases in government 
                                                 
21 The regressions reported here exclude two very influential observations.  Ethiopia has by far the largest 
debt relief in this sub-period, and Democratic Republic of Congo registers extremely large increases in 
several of the outcome variables largely reflecting their very low initial values during its civil war in the late 
1990s.      29
spending is at least positive, although it still falls short of significance even at the 10 
percent level.  
 
 
7.  Conclusions 
 
  In this paper we have used a new database measuring the present value of debt 
relief to low-income countries to empirically investigate the impacts of debt relief.  The 
evidence we have uncovered so far is rather disappointing.  We find very little evidence 
that debt relief has had any impact on the level or composition of public spending.  Nor 
do we find that debt relief has led to improvements in policy or increases in investment 
rates.  It is therefore also not very surprising that the growth impacts of debt relief do not 
appear to be significantly different from zero.  These negative findings should temper 
enthusiasm for further debt relief efforts such as those recently proposed by the G-8 
countries. 
 
  Nevertheless, we recognize that our work so far has several limitations.  One has 
to do with the quality of our data on debt relief.  Short of an exhaustive loan-by-loan 
examination of individual debt relief agreements it is very difficult to come up with 
accurate measures of the associated reduction in future debt service obligations.  This 
forces us to rely on a number of crude assumptions, which we apply to aggregate data in 
order to come up with approximations of the present value reduction due to debt relief.  
Simple measurement error in our right-hand-side variable could contribute to our failure 
to find significant impacts of debt relief on outcomes in either direction.   
 
  A further difficulty has to do with the timing of debt relief and its impacts on 
outcomes.  We have made an effort to measure the reduction in the present value of 
future debt service obligations due to debt relief in a given country and year.  This is a 
useful way to summarize the effects of both debt forgiveness and concessional 
reschedulings.  Moreover, if the government benefitting from debt relief were not credit 
constrained, then the timing of the actual subsequent reductions in debt service would 
not be relevant -- only total reduction in the present value of debt is what matters.  But in 
reality virtually all of the countries receiving debt relief in our sample are likely to be 
highly credit-constrained.  This means that governments will only be able to increase   30
spending in response to debt relief in years where debt service reductions actually 
occur.  This in turn suggests that changes in spending, and possibly other outcomes, are 
more likely to be associated with the realized future flow reductions in debt service, 
rather than with the initial reduction in the present value of debt due to debt relief.     
Unfortunately, it is very difficult to accurately measure the time path of future reductions 
in debt service due to debt relief short of delving into loan-by-loan data on debt relief, 
and this is something that we leave for future research.   
 
  Despite these measurement difficulties, we nevertheless think that it is unlikely 
that even with better data we will be able find very large development impacts of debt 
relief.  While the present value of debt relief granted to low-income countries over the 
past decade appears to be considerable, it is actually quite small when compared with 
foreign aid, or with the value of total tax revenues that it is intended to augment.   In our 
sample of 62 low-income countries, the median present value of all debt relief between 
1989 and 2003 was between 9 and 12 percent of GDP in 1988, depending on which of 
our two methods we use.  In contrast, the present value of all net aid receipts of these 
countries over the same period was more than an order of magnitude larger, at 126 
percent of GDP, and the present value of tax revenues was greater still at 142 percent of 
GDP.  This simple calculation shows that past debt relief has actually been quite small 
relative to other forms of aid, and even smaller when compared with domestic tax 
revenues in recipient countries.  Looking forward, even if all of these countries had their 
entire stock of public and publicly-guaranteed external debt as of end-2003 forgiven, the 
present value of this debt reduction would be just 49 percent of GDP for the median 
country in our sample.  In contrast, the present value of future aid receipts and tax 
revenues would be much larger at 134 and 190 percent of GDP for the median country, 
conservatively assuming that aid receipts and tax revenues remain constant at their 
historical average values. 
 
  As one of our opening quotations noted, debt relief can provide "much-needed 
respite from high debt service", and as such constitutes a resource transfer to recipient 
countries, albeit modest in present value terms.  We therefore do not claim based on our 
results that debt relief provides no benefits whatsoever to recipient countries.  Rather our 
findings support the conclusion that, based on past experience, further debt relief is 
unlikely to have particularly large development impacts.  It therefore seems important   31
that the recent emphasis on debt relief among donors does not divert attention or 
resources from other forms of aid that may have larger development impacts.  
 
 
Appendix A:  Estimates of the Present Value of Debt Relief 
 
Method 1:  Estimates Based on Global Development Finance Data 
 
Our first set of estimates is based on published and unpublished data from the World 
Bank’s Global Development Finance report (GDF).  The GDF has reported data on debt 
forgiveness and debt restructurings since 1989.  The aggregate data reported in the 
GDF is drawn from debtor-reported data on individual loans recorded in the Debtor 
Reporting System (DRS) database, a very large loan-by-loan dataset maintained by the 
World Bank containing in principle every external debt obligation of all developing 
countries.  Changes in the present value of debt due to debt relief could be accurately 
constructed from the loan-by-loan information recorded in the DRS database.  This 
however is a very labour-intensive task requiring extensive familiarity with the DRS 
database, and it is not something that we have attempted here.  Rather, we base our 
estimates on aggregate data from the DRS, together with certain assumptions detailed 
below.  
 
We begin by taking the GDF item “debt forgiveness or reduction”, which captures the 
nominal value of debt forgiven (including interest and principal arrears forgiven), or 
otherwise reduced through deals such as debt buy-backs.  In the case of low-income 
countries these buybacks are typically aid-financed and hence constitute a transfer from 
donor countries just as is the case for debt forgiveness.
22  Note that debt forgiveness 
includes only forgiveness of principal, and so we add to this the GDF item “interest 
forgiven”.   We next assume that the average rate of concessionality (i.e. the ratio of the 
present value to the face value of debt) of the debt forgiven or reduced is the same as 
the average rate of concessionality for the total stock of debt outstanding of the country.  
The change in the present value of debt due to debt forgiveness or debt reduction is 
then simply the product of the nominal amount reported in the GDF and the average 
concessionality rate.  We obtain the latter from a new database on the present value of 
external public and publicly-guaranteed debt constructed by Dikhanov (2004), that we 
use throughout this paper.
23 
 
                                                 
22 There are however exceptions to this general rule.  For example, in Nigeria the GDF reports roughly $2 
billion in “debt forgiveness or reduction” in 1992 and which goes into our debt relief estimate.  However, this 
primarily reflects a large debt-buyback agreement concluded between Nigeria and its private creditors in 
1992, that was largely financed by Nigeria’s own resources.  Since we do not have systematic information 
on the financing of all of these debt-buybacks in low-income countries, we simply include all of them, 
recognizing that for a few of the richer countries in our sample such as Nigeria this will not capture donor-
funded debt relief.  
23 Daseking and Powell (1999) also rely on this data on debt forgiveness and reduction in their first estimate 
of debt relief.  They do not however estimate the reduction in the present value of debt due to debt 
forgiveness as we do here by using information on the overal concessionality of debt.   32
We also want to measure the change in the present value of debt due to 
concessional reschedulings.  However, published GDF data on debt rescheduling is 
problematic for our purposes.  To see why, consider the hypothetical example of a 
country that in 2000 agrees with its creditors to consolidate all of the debt service due 
between 2000 and 2004 into a new loan with more concessional terms than the original 
loan.  Although no debt forgiveness has taken place, there has been a reduction in the 
present value of the country’s future obligations as a result of the agreement signed in 
2000.  However, the GDF convention is to report the flows of debt service rescheduled in 
each of the five years between 2000 and 2004.  As a result, the GDF items “Principal 
Rescheduled” and “Interest Rescheduled” in a given year capture flows of debt service 
relief due to previous debt relief agreements, rather than the stock of debt rescheduled 
due to agreements in the current year.
24 
 
We instead use unpublished GDF data on “Rescheduling Commitments”, which 
captures the total stock of debt that is rescheduled as a result of debt restructurings 
agreed upon in that year.  Once we have the stock of debt rescheduled, we next need to 
make assumptions regarding the degree of concessionality of the rescheduling.  Here 
we unfortunately have very little information, and the degree of concessionality can in 
practice vary widely.  For example, in Paris Club agreements (described in more detail 
below) creditors have the choice between reducing the present value of debt through 
“debt service reductions” or “debt reductions”.  Under the former option, the total amount 
of debt covered by the agreement is rescheduled on concessional terms in order to 
achieve the desired present value reduction.  Under the latter option, a fraction of the 
debt is forgiven outright (and is recorded as “debt forgiveness”, but the remainder that is 
rescheduled is done so with no further concessionality.   
 
Unfortunately, the aggregated GDF data on Rescheduling Commitments does not 
allow us to distinguish between such cases of concessional and non-concessional 
reschedulings.  Absent better information, we make the following assumptions.  For 
countries that did not have any prior concessional Paris Club agreement, we assume 
that the rescheduling observed in the GDF was non-concessional, i.e. the change in the 
present value of the amount restructured is zero.  For countries that did have a prior 
Paris Club agreement, we assume that half of the amount rescheduled was done on 
non-concessional terms, and the other half was rescheduled on the most recent Paris 
Club terms received by the country.
25  Finally, we continue to assume that the 
concessionality of the stock of debt restructured prior to the restructuring is the same as 
that of the total debt stock of the country.   
 
  The main advantage of this GDF-based measure of debt relief is that it is 
comprehensive in the sense of capturing debt relief granted by all creditors, as it is 
based on debtor-reported data that in principle is comprehensive.  Two disadvantages 
weigh against this.  First, given the weak debt management capacity of many low-
income countries and the complexity of many debt restructurings, we expect debtor-
reported data on debt relief to be relatively noisy.  Second, reported GDF data does not 
provide information on the terms of reschedulings and hence we need to rely on fairly 
arbitrary assumptions regarding the extent of concessionality of these restructurings.   
                                                 
24 Daseking and Powell (1999) simply use the published GDF data on debt rescheduling, but interpret it as if 
it were the stock of debt rescheduled.  
25 We are assuming here that reschedulings with non-Paris Club creditors have the same terms as thos with 
Paris Club creditors.  This assumption can be justified by the requirement in Paris Club agreements that the 
debtor seeks “comparable treatment” of debts owed to non-Paris Club creditors.   33
This is a non-trivial concern, as reschedulings are an important component of overall 
debt relief.  As shown in Table 1, roughly 20 percent of our estimated total amount of 
debt relief using this method consists of concessional reschedulings. 
 
Method 2:  Estimates Based on Creditor-Reported Data 
 
  Our second estimate of debt relief is based on creditor-reported data from a 
variety of sources.
26  We begin with data reported by the Paris Club on its agreements 
with individual debtor countries.  The Paris Club is a group of bilateral official creditors 
that jointly negotiates debt restructurings with individual debtor countries.  Although the 
Paris Club has been in existence since 1956, only since late-1988 have Paris Club 
agreements with qualifying low-income countries had the explicit intent of reducing the 
present value of their outstanding obligations covered by the agreement.
27   In order to 
benefit from these debt reductions, creditor countries need to be poor, highly indebted, 
and have an IMF program in effect.  Individual Paris Club agreements specify the debt 
instruments covered by the agreement (known as the amount “treated”) and the 
intended reduction in their present value.  The actual reschedulings to achieve the 
intended present value reduction are carried out through bilateral deals between the 
country and each of its creditors.  As mentioned above, creditor countries can choose 
from a menu of options for present value of debt reductions.  Typically these consist 
either of outright forgiveness combined with a non-concessional rescheduling of the 
balance (known as “debt reductions”), or else concessional reschedulings of the entire 
loan with no forgiveness (known as “debt service reductions”). The Paris Club has 
successively increased the concessionality of its agreements, with reductions in the 
present value of the amount of debt “treated” increasing from 33% (known as “Toronto” 
terms since October 1988), to 50% (“London” terms since December 1991), to 67% 
(“Naples” terms since December 1994), to 80% (“Lyons” terms since November 1996), 
and finally to 90% (“Cologne” terms since November 1999).    
 
We have retrieved information on all concessional agreements with low-income 
countries since 1988 from the Paris Club website (www.clubdeparis.org).  This source 
reports the total amount of debt “treated” under the agreement, as well as the broad 
terms of the treatment.  To estimate the change in the present value of debt due to the 
agreement, we take the intended present value reduction and multiply it by the nominal 
amount of debt treated.  As above, we convert this to present value terms by multiplying 
by the average concessionality of the overall stock of debt in the country in that year.  
There are two drawbacks to this method.  The first is that present value reductions under 
Paris Club agreements typically apply only to non-Official Development Assistance (non-
ODA) credits, while the treatment of ODA credits involves less additional 
concessionality.  Unfortunately, the Paris Club does not systematically report the 
amounts of ODA and non-ODA credits treated.  However, in our sample non-ODA 
credits account for the bulk of bilateral credits, so applying the present value reduction to 
                                                 
26 We do not separately consider another potential source of creditor-reported data on debt relief, the OECD 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) database.  The DAC data follow similar reporting conventions as 
the GDF.  In particular, reschedulings are reported by recipient only on a flow basis, and data on 
rescheduling committments is not reported by recipient.  One particular weakness of the DAC data is that its 
measure of debt cancellation mixes data on present value reductions from Paris Club agreement with data 
on the face value of debt cancellations from other types of debt forgiveness.  See OECD (2000) for details.   
27 Previous Paris Club agreements consisted of reschedulings that were intended to maintain the present 
value of the debt service flows to creditors.  Of course, unanticipated movements in interest rates still 
affected the present value of repayments, but these were unintended changes in the present value of debt.   34
the total amount treated rather than only the non-ODA portion will probably not seriously 
overstate the amount of debt relief.   
 
The second problem involves double counting of debt relief in countries that have 
benefitted from successive Paris Club agreements.  For example, the total amount of 
debt “treated” under London terms for a country may include some debt that was 
previously reduced under Toronto terms.  The Paris Club agreement will specify that the 
previously-reduced debt gets only a 17% present value reduction to “top up” the present 
value reduction from 33% under Toronto terms to the 50% under London terms.  By 
applying the 50% present value reduction to the total amount of debt treated, we are 
again overestimating the amount of debt relief provided to the extent that this 
doublecounting is important.  Unfortunately there is little we can do about this problem 
as the Paris Club does not systematically report information at this level of detail.   
 
  Our second data source for this method captures debt relief provided by 
multilateral creditors under the HIPC initiative, which was the first time multilateral 
creditors have provided relief with respect to their own loans.  We have obtained from 
World Bank country documents estimates of the present value of multilateral debt relief 
actually implemented, by HIPC country and by year.  Since this data is already reported 
in present value terms we simply add it to the Paris Club data described above.
 28 
 
  Our third data source captures donor-financed buybacks of commercial debts 
owed by low-income countries.  The IDA Debt Reduction Facility was created in 1989 
and has provided $632 million in grants to 21 low-income countries that qualify for 
highly-concessional lending from the International Development Association (IDA).   
Since most of the commercial debt repurchased under this facility was bought at a steep 
discount, the nominal amount of debt obligations removed from debtor countries is much 
larger, totalling approximately $8 billion.  Since commercial debt is non-concessional, we 
take the face value of the amount of the debt buybacks for each country and add it to our 
previous two items.  
 
  Our final data source for this method captures debt relief provided by the Russian 
Federation.  Unfortunately, we are not aware of a systematic source of creditor-reported 
data on this debt relief.  Instead, we have obtained unpublished detailed data from the 
GDF on Russian debt relief, which allows us to isolate, by debtor country and by year, 
the GDF variables used in our first method (i.e. debt forgiveness or reduction, interest 
forgiven, and rescheduled commitments).  We then use the same assumptions as we 
did for the first method to move from these variables to estimates of the change in the 
present value of debt due to debt relief.  We multiply “debt forgiveness or reduction”, 
which captures the nominal value of debt forgiven by the concessionality rate to obtain 
the present value of debt forgiven by Russia. For “Rescheduled Commitments” we again 
assume that for countries with concessional Paris Club agreements, half of the 
rescheduled amount is concessional and apply to it the most recent Paris Club terms 
received by the country. We multiply these figures by the concessionality rate before 
adding them to the present value of debt forgiven by Russia previously obtained. 
 
  This method of estimating debt relief has two main advantages.  First, it primarily 
relies on creditor-reported data which is likely to be of better quality than debtor-reported 
                                                 
28 We are particularly grateful to Boris Gamarra and Sunyoung Lee at the World Bank for providing this data.  
The data are reported in present value terms as of the year in which the debt relief is provided.   35
data.  Second, for Paris Club relief and multilateral debt relief, we have more direct 
information on the intended present value reduction of debt relief, which we did not have 
in our first method.  However, the main disadvantage of this method is that it is not as 
comprehensive as the debtor-reported data, as it does not capture debt relief granted by 




Appendix B:  Changes in the Present Value of Debt 
 
 
  In this appendix we show how to measure the contribution of debt relief to 
changes in the present value of debt.  We first introduce notation for the present value of 
debt and debt relief, and then show the decomposition of changes over time in the 
present value of debt as a share of exports. 
 
Notation for the Present Value of Debt 
 
Let DSit denote the flow debt service due in period t on loans that were 
contracted in period i.  We assume that DSit=0 for t≤i, i.e. debt service obligations are 
incurred no earlier than the first period after which the loan is contracted.  The present 
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where  δ is the discount rate.  The present value of debt at time T consists of the 
discounted value of all future debt service obligations associated with all loans 
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+ +  denote the reduction in debt service due in period T+1+s on loans 
contracted in period i due to debt relief granted in period T+1.  We assume that 
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+ + =0 if s≤0, i.e. debt relief involves only the reduction of future debt service 
obligations, and 
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+ + =0 if i>T, i.e. debt relief can only be granted during period T+1 on 
loans contracted in period T or earlier.  These reductions in debt service may be due 
either to the outright cancellation of a loan (which eliminates the future associated debt 
service), or due to a concessional restructuring of a loan (in which case 
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+
+ +  captures 
the net change in debt service associated with the elimination of the old loan and its 
replacement with a new loan with easier terms). The change in the present value of debt 
between period T and period T+1 can be written as:  
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29 For some countries and years this type of debt relief is substantial.  For example, in the early 1990s Egypt 
was the beneficiary of very large writeoffs of military debt owed to the United States, and writeoffs of other 
debts owed to other Arab states.  These bilateral writeoffs were done outside the Paris Club and hence are 
not captured by our Method 2, but they are captured by Method 1 as they were reported to the GDF.   36
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reductions in future debt service granted during period T+1.  As detailed in the text, we 
provide estimates of PVDRT on an annual basis for 62 low-income countries between 
1989 and 2003. 
 
Changes over Time in the Present Value of Debt 
 
  It is useful to interate Equation (B2) forward k periods and reorganize to obtain 
the following expression for the discounted growth rate of the present value of debt 
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The left-hand side of Equation (B3) is the discounted growth rate of the present value of 
debt in period T values between period T and T+k.  The first term on the right-hand side 
captures the present value of all new borrowing during periods T+1 through T+k, 
discounted back to period T and expressed as a share of debt in period T.  The second 
term captures the same present value of debt relief granted during periods T+1 through 
T+k, again discounted back to period T and normalized by period T debt.  In the text we 
refer to this second term, evaluated between T=1988, T=1993, and T=1998 with k=5 
years as the debt relief ratios for these three periods. 
 
  We can also divide Equation (B3) by exports, Xt, and rearrange to obtain the 
following expression for the change in the present value of debt relative to exports, 
which is a standard measure of the (change in the) debt burden of a country.  This 
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where g is the average annual growth rate of exports between periods T and T+k.  The 
first two terms again capture the present value of new borrowing and the present value 
of debt relief, now normalized by exports.  The third term captures the contribution of 
export growth to changes in the present value of debt.  The higher is export growth g, 
the lower is the change in the ratio of the present value of debt to exports. 
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  We use Equation (B4) to account for the contribution of debt relief to changes in 
the present value of debt relative to exports over our three periods, 1988-1993, 1993-
1998, and 1998-2003.  We measure the left-hand side directly using the measure of the 
present value of total debt described in the text, and we also measure the second term 
on the right-hand side directly using our estimates of debt relief.  We use a discount rate 
of 7.25%, which is the average over the period 1989-2003 of the OECD’s “commerical 
interest reference rate” for long-maturity US-dollar-denominated obligations.  We also 
directly measure the third term capturing the contribution of export growth, using the 
growth rate of current dollar exports over each period for each country.  We measure the 
first term as a residual.  In the data, this residual will consist of not only the present value 
of net flows described above, but also two other factors not captured in the above 
decomposition for notational convenience:  changes in the US dollar value of debt due to 
cross-currency valuation changes, and changes in the present value of debt due to 
fluctuations over time in the discount rate used to construct the present value series on 
the left-hand side.  
 
  Appendix Table B provides some summary statistics on this decomposition.  We 
first decompose the variance of changes in the present value of debt relative to exports 
into the the parts attributable to the three terms in Equation (B4).  We do this by 
reporting the slope coefficients of regressions of each of the individual components on 
the total change in debt.  The slope coefficient can be interpreted as the share of the 
variance of changes in debt due to the corresponding component.    We do this for 
changes in debt over our three subperiods, again eliminating a handful of observations 
with extreme changes in the present value of debt to exports. The first row reports the 
share of the variance due to growth in exports in the denominator of the debt ratio.  This 
share is substantial in all three periods, ranging from 52 percent to 79 percent.  The next 
two rows report the contribution of debt relief, for our two alternative estimates.  This 
contribution is small for all periods, and is at most 24 percent in the first period, using our 
first measure of debt relief.  The remaining rows of the table report the share of the 
variance in changes in debt due to a combination of other factors including net new 
borrowing, cross-currency valuation changes, and changes in discount rates used to 
calculate present values.  These other factors unrelated to debt relief also contribute 
importantly to changes in debt, particularly in the last subperiod.
30 
 
  We also report the simple correlation between the debt relief component and the 
change in total debt.  These correlations are small in most cases, and rise to 0.56 only in 
the first period and for the first measure of debt relief.  Together the results in this table 
highlight the fact that debt relief has typically had only a small impact on overall debt 







                                                 
30 This finding is consistent with Easterly (2002) who documents that among HIPC countries, debt relief and 




Appendix Table B:  Variance Decomposition for Changes  
in Present Value of Debt Relative to Exports 
 
1988-1993 1993-1998 1998-2003
Share of Variance of Total Change in PV of Debt/Exports Due to:
Growth Component 0.64 0.79 0.52
Debt Relief Component
  Method 1 0.24 0.08 0.13
  Method 2 0.04 0.05 0.00
Residual
  Method 1 0.12 0.13 0.35
  Method 2 0.32 0.16 0.48
Correlation of Debt Relief With Total Changes in PV of Debt/Exports
Method 1 0.56 0.17 0.33
Method 2 0.30 0.14 0.00
 
   39
Appendix C:  Data Definitions and Sources 
 
Variable* Sources  Definitions/Explanations 
Real Per Capita 
GDP Growth 
 
WDI  GDP data in constant local currency unit (LCU). 
Aid/GDP  GDF and WDI  Official development assistance and official aid as 





Gupta, Clements, Tiongson 
(1998), and GDF 
Total government expenditures as a share of GDP 
net of interest payments on public and publicly-
guaranteed debt. 
 
Share of Health and 
Education 
 
Gupta, Clements, Tiongson 
(1998), and GDF 
Government expenditure in education and health 
as a share of total government expenditures.  
Tax Revenues/GDP 
 
Baunsgaard and Keen (2004), 
and GFS 
Tax revenue as a share of GDP. Data from 1975 
to 2000 in Baunsgaard-Keen, extended using 
changes in GFS data. 
  
Share of Trade 
Taxes 
 
Baunsgaard and Keen (2004), 
and GFS 
Trade taxes as a share of GDP. Data from 1975 to 
2000 in Baunsgaard-Keen, extended using 




World  Bank  Data  Country Policy and Institutional Assessment 










GDF  Sum of interest and principal arrears (both in 
current USD) 
Debt Relief 1  Own estimates based on GDF 
and Reschedule Commitments 
(GDF unpublished) 
Reductions during the period in the present value 
of debt due to debt relief as share of exports at the 
beginning of the period. See section 3 (Method 1) 
of the paper for details. 
 
Debt Relief 2  Own estimates based on Paris 
Club, Multilateral (WB data), 
IDA Debt Reduction Facility, 
and GDF on Russian debt 
relief 
 
Reductions during the period in the present value 
of debt due to debt relief as share of exports at the 
beginning of the period. See section 3 (Method 2) 
of the paper for details. 
Present Value of 
Debt/Exports 
Dikhanov  (2004)  and  WDI  Present value of public and publicly-guaranteed 
debt as a share of Exports (both in current USD) 
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Note:  Summary statistics refer to five-year averages of indicated variables. 
 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Debt Relief 1/Exports 0.383 0.580 0.365 0.537 0.264 0.533
Debt Relief 2/Exports 0.091 0.137 0.308 0.454 0.529 0.880
Aid/GDP 0.166 0.164 0.151 0.154 0.120 0.107
Real Per Capita GDP Growth -0.007 0.037 0.015 0.030 0.019 0.029
Government Spending/GDP 0.284 0.118 0.257 0.115 0.287 0.134
Share of Health and Education 0.198 0.069 0.215 0.067 0.232 0.076
Tax Revenues/GDP 0.140 0.064 0.138 0.068 0.141 0.058
Share of Trade Taxes 0.290 0.138 0.261 0.117 0.215 0.125
Policy Quality 3.144 0.838 3.197 0.789 3.071 0.598
Investment/GDP 0.199 0.103 0.212 0.117 0.233 0.129
Arrears / Outstanding Debt 0.120 0.140 0.154 0.182 0.148 0.203
PV of Debt / Exports 2.502 1.537 2.957 1.910 2.600 2.044
1989-1993 1994-1998 1999-2003  41
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Table 1:  Estimates of Total Debt Relief  
 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Millions US Dollars
Method 1
Debt Forgiven or Reduced 3270 2180 2390 2910 1150 3320 3750 9180 8000 944 4130 9810 4800 5080 2480
Reschedulings 498 753 775 918 347 990 870 1050 2460 630 1030 317 638 1610 176
Total Method 1 3770 2930 3160 3830 1490 4310 4620 10200 10500 1570 5150 10100 5440 6690 2650
Method 2
Paris Club 551 657 434 1090 566 1510 2360 2490 3050 1760 2020 661 4160 7540 160
M u l t i l a t e r a l  C r e d i t o r s 000000000 5 5 8 7 7 5 7 9 8 0 1 8 7 0 1 4 6 0 2390
IDA Facility 0 0 231 69 323 210 1330 350 45 724 34 62 452 0 266
Russian Debt 1 670 0 0 60 0 1 6560 2530 43 3610 9270 217 360 239
Total Method 2 551 1330 664 1160 949 1720 3690 9390 5630 3090 6430 18000 6700 9360 3060
Present Value of Debt Relief as of: 1988 2003
Method 1
Debt Forgiven or Reduced 34563 109938
Reschedulings 7502.8 23865
Total Method 1 42043 133729
Method 2
Paris Club 14490 46090
Multilateral Creditors 6039 19210
IDA Facility 2280 7251
Russian Debt 11459 36449
Total Method 2 34278 109031
   45
 
 
Table 2:  Estimates of Debt Relief by Country 
 
Total Debt Relief, Millions USD Total Debt Relief, Share of Initial Debt
Method 1 Method2 Method 1 Method2
Code Country 1989-1993 1994-1998 1999-2003 1989-1993 1994-1998 1999-2003 1989-1993 1994-1998 1999-2003 1989-1993 1994-1998 1999-2003
AGO Angola 0 2830 8 0 2830 0 0.0% 30.1% 0.1% 0.0% 30.1% 0.0%
ARM Armenia 0 0 25 0 0 24 .. 0.0% 7.0% .. 0.0% 6.6%
AZE Azerbaijan 0 17 0 0 0 0 .. 48.8% 0.0% .. 0.0% 0.0%
BDI Burundi 45 7 8 0 0 0 11.8% 1.2% 1.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
BEN Benin 172 121 65 65 60 187 21.8% 14.1% 7.1% 8.2% 6.9% 20.4%
BFA Burkina Faso 108 78 91 18 18 368 23.2% 11.8% 12.4% 3.8% 2.7% 49.8%
BGD Bangladesh 117 0 53 0 0 0 2.3% 0.0% 0.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
BOL Bolivia 1230 523 995 187 1020 853 36.0% 16.7% 29.8% 5.5% 32.8% 25.6%
BTN Bhutan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
CAF Central African Repu 75 47 5 1 21 0 22.1% 9.1% 0.9% 0.2% 4.0% 0.0%
CHN China 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
CIV Cote d'Ivoire 290 5110 578 0 1980 850 3.4% 44.5% 6.0% 0.0% 17.3% 8.8%
CMR Cameroon 276 1270 971 0 1290 1190 8.9% 21.3% 14.9% 0.0% 21.6% 18.2%
COG Congo, Rep. 151 639 19 0 899 0 4.5% 14.4% 0.4% 0.0% 20.3% 0.0%
COM Comoros 22 3 0 0 0 0 19.7% 2.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
DJI Djibouti 12 7 1 0 0 0 12.9% 4.8% 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
ERI Eritrea 0 0 0 0 0 0 .. 0.0% 0.0% .. 0.0% 0.0%
ETH Ethiopia 126 217 3280 137 396 3880 2.7% 2.6% 37.5% 3.0% 4.8% 44.4%
GHA Ghana 121 39 169 0 0 943 9.5% 1.6% 4.4% 0.0% 0.0% 24.8%
GIN Guinea 285 143 87 80 79 361 17.9% 6.9% 3.8% 5.0% 3.8% 15.6%
GMB Gambia, The 0 0 6 0 0 36 0.1% 0.0% 2.4% 0.0% 0.0% 14.9%
GNB Guinea-Bissau 11 75 168 6 90 283 2.9% 12.5% 23.4% 1.5% 15.0% 39.2%
GNQ Equatorial Guinea 14 0 0 13 21 0 9.7% 0.0% 0.0% 9.5% 10.9% 0.0%
GUY Guyana 253 396 281 100 349 463 26.0% 27.2% 32.1% 10.3% 24.0% 52.8%
HND Honduras 575 90 261 57 60 503 23.6% 2.6% 7.8% 2.3% 1.7% 15.1%
HTI Haiti 71 32 0 0 32 0 19.0% 7.5% 0.0% 0.0% 7.4% 0.0%
IND India 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
KEN Kenya 400 14 7 0 0 0 12.1% 0.3% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
KHM Cambodia 115 61 0 0 105 0 11.2% 4.4% 0.0% 0.0% 7.7% 0.0%
LAO Lao PDR 5 0 0 0 0 0 1.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
LBR Liberia 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
   46
 
 
Table 2, Cont'd:  Estimates of Debt Relief by Country 
 
  Total Debt Relief, Millions USD Total Debt Relief, Share of Initial Debt
Method 1 Method2 Method 1 Method2
Code Country 1989-1993 1994-1998 1999-2003 1989-1993 1994-1998 1999-2003 1989-1993 1994-1998 1999-2003 1989-1993 1994-1998 1999-2003
LSO Lesotho 4 0 0 0 0 0 2.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
MDA Moldova 0 0 116 0 0 105 .. 0.0% 14.6% .. 0.0% 13.3%
MDG Madagascar 521 236 209 29 463 474 19.0% 8.1% 6.5% 1.1% 16.0% 14.7%
MLI Mali 19 267 336 8 30 620 2.1% 13.8% 17.1% 0.9% 1.5% 31.6%
MMR Myanmar 45 0 0 0 0 0 1.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
MNG Mongolia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
MOZ Mozambique 1110 706 2260 949 255 3570 33.7% 17.6% 47.8% 28.8% 6.3% 75.4%
MRT Mauritania 158 56 358 74 69 564 12.0% 3.5% 21.6% 5.6% 4.3% 34.0%
MWI Malawi 27 0 89 0 0 424 4.3% 0.0% 6.9% 0.0% 0.0% 32.9%
NER Niger 210 136 116 104 84 312 26.6% 15.1% 12.0% 13.2% 9.3% 32.2%
NGA Nigeria 2190 1440 125 0 0 0 8.2% 5.1% 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
NIC Nicaragua 748 5620 1180 272 3860 1400 10.1% 56.2% 22.6% 3.7% 38.6% 26.9%
NPL Nepal 4 0 1 0 0 0 0.7% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
PAK Pakistan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
RWA Rwanda 22 8 25 0 14 325 8.2% 1.8% 4.0% 0.0% 3.1% 52.4%
SDN Sudan 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
SEN Senegal 632 331 57 83 311 234 26.8% 13.8% 2.7% 3.5% 13.0% 11.0%
SLE Sierra Leone 75 234 80 47 227 283 16.8% 22.0% 10.2% 10.7% 21.4% 36.2%
SOM Somalia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
STP Sao Tome and Princi 0 6 18 0 9 65 0.5% 4.9% 11.4% 0.0% 7.2% 41.9%
TCD Chad 40 50 24 4 11 111 19.1% 11.1% 4.1% 2.1% 2.3% 18.9%
TGO Togo 129 148 2 41 117 0 17.8% 17.7% 0.2% 5.7% 13.9% 0.0%
TJK Tajikistan 0 0 13 0 0 0 .. 0.0% 2.9% .. 0.0% 0.0%
TZA Tanzania 534 646 1340 241 648 2210 13.6% 12.5% 24.6% 6.1% 12.6% 40.5%
UGA Uganda 128 329 197 173 267 524 12.3% 19.6% 10.0% 16.7% 15.9% 26.5%
UZB Uzbekistan 0 0 0 0 0 0 .. 0.0% 0.0% .. 0.0% 0.0%
VNM Vietnam 227 496 7730 180 0 7670 46.7% 2.4% 37.2% 37.0% 0.0% 36.9%
YEM Yemen, Rep. 12 2170 163 0 2680 433 0.3% 35.4% 5.0% 0.0% 43.9% 13.3%
ZAR Congo, Dem. Rep. 328 0 2970 372 0 5060 6.6% 0.0% 25.5% 7.5% 0.0% 43.4%
ZMB Zambia 844 542 302 482 415 1750 21.1% 14.7% 7.2% 12.1% 11.2% 41.9%
ZWE Zimbabwe 16 48 4 0 0 0 0.9% 1.7% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Total 12499 25187 24792 3723 18707 36075 Avg 11.0% 9.1% 7.9% 3.6% 7.0% 15.5% 
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Table 3:  Estimated Impact of Debt Relief 
 
Change 1994-1998 Over 1989-1993 Change 1999-2003 Over 1994-1998
Method 1 Method 2 # Obs Method 1 Method 2 # Obs
Real Per Capita GDP Growth -0.001 0.042 46 -0.011 -0.008 54
0.13 1.61 1.51 0.95
Government Spending/GDP 0.003 -0.001 35 0.004 -0.001 44
0.20 0.02 0.35 0.09
Share of Health and Education -0.006 0.028 35 0.039 0.043 43
0.30 0.48 3.55 2.99
Tax Revenues/GDP 0.013 0.047 40 0.004 0.011 41
1.45 1.75 1.01 1.38
Aid/GDP -0.001 -0.167 47 -0.020 -0.025 54
0.09 1.94 1.15 0.80
Policy Quality 0.390 1.989 48 0.041 0.047 54
3.37 3.76 0.48 0.42
Share of Trade Taxes -0.076 -0.332 40 0.009 0.006 41
1.61 1.91 0.64 0.22
Investment/GDP 0.001 0.125 44 0.005 -0.020 48
0.10 0.93 0.31 1.02  
Note: Each row of the table corresponds to a regression of the change in the five-year average of the indicated variable on cumulative debt relief 
over previous five-year period. Coefficient estimates in bold and absolute value of t-statistics below   48
 
 
Table 4:  Nonlinear Impacts of Debt Relief 
 
Change 1994-1998 Over 1989-1993 Change 1999-2003 Over 1994-1998
Linear Term Interaction Term Linear Term Interaction Term
Method 1 Method 2 Method 1 Method 2 Method 1 Method 2 Method 1 Method 2
Part 1:  Interactions With Arrears
Real Per Capita GDP Growth 0.000 0.041 -0.003 0.048 -0.012 -0.007 -0.014 -0.217
0.03 1.23 0.15 0.36 1.32 0.71 0.32 0.62
Government Spending/GDP -0.003 -0.006 0.028 0.134 0.005 -0.002 -0.012 0.009
0.14 0.10 0.79 0.59 0.32 0.12 0.16 0.16
Share of Health and Education -0.036 -0.029 0.046 0.245 0.038 0.047 -0.082 -0.076
1.53 0.45 1.22 1.01 2.66 2.67 1.12 1.35
Tax Revenues/GDP 0.009 0.045 0.011 0.054 0.005 0.010 0.036 0.009
0.60 1.16 0.51 0.44 0.80 1.23 1.31 0.40
Policy Quality 0.446 2.023 -0.670 -1.225 0.040 0.074 -0.449 -0.570
2.67 2.93 1.55 0.44 0.36 0.56 0.81 1.30
Share of Trade Taxes -0.107 -0.344 0.087 0.233 0.010 0.004 0.035 0.035
2.06 2.74 1.20 0.57 0.56 0.17 0.43 0.54
Investment/GDP 0.002 0.128 -0.012 -0.086 0.007 -0.022 0.238 0.023
0.07 1.06 0.16 0.18 0.33 0.78 2.23 0.25
Note: Each row of the table corresponds to a regression of the change in the five-year average of the indicated variable on cumulative debt relief over 
previous five-year period. Coefficient estimates in bold and absolute value of t-statistics below.   49
 
 
Table 4, Cont'd:  Nonlinear Impacts of Debt Relief 
 
Change 1994-1998 Over 1989-1993 Change 1999-2003 Over 1994-1998
Linear Term Interaction Term Linear Term Interaction Term
Method 1 Method 2 Method 1 Method 2 Method 1 Method 2 Method 1 Method 2
Part 2:  Interactions With Policy
Real Per Capita GDP Growth 0.006 0.047 -0.016 -0.281 -0.006 -0.002 -0.022 -0.029
0.40 1.33 0.85 0.38 0.62 0.21 1.39 1.46
Government Spending/GDP -0.006 -0.005 0.021 0.118 0.005 -0.009 0.000 0.033
0.23 0.08 0.67 0.55 0.29 0.45 0.02 0.98
Share of Health and Education -0.028 -0.024 0.007 0.111 0.050 0.056 -0.044 -0.056
1.04 0.36 0.22 0.48 3.25 3.01 1.78 1.79
Tax Revenues/GDP -0.005 0.028 0.028 0.091 0.008 0.017 -0.010 -0.019
0.26 0.69 1.39 1.24 1.09 1.89 0.99 1.46
Policy Quality 0.533 2.216 -0.904 -1.581 0.109 0.116 -0.259 -0.322
3.27 3.10 2.78 1.05 0.89 0.82 1.29 1.28
Share of Trade Taxes -0.112 -0.259 0.055 -0.344 0.017 0.011 -0.024 -0.014
1.74 1.97 0.78 1.44 0.84 0.41 0.78 0.37
Investment/GDP 0.002 0.124 -0.005 0.014 0.013 -0.015 -0.027 -0.027
0.06 0.99 0.09 0.05 0.50 0.49 0.66 0.53
Note: Each row of the table corresponds to a regression of the change in the five-year average of the indicated variable on cumulative debt relief over 
previous five-year period. Coefficient estimates in bold and absolute value of t-statistics below.   50
 
Table 5:  Instrumental Variables Estimates of Effects of Debt Relief 
 
Change 1994-1998 Over 1989-1993 Change 1999-2003 Over 1994-1998
Method 1 Method 2 # Obs Method 1 Method 2 # Obs
Coefficient on Debt Relief in IV
Regression where Dependent Variable
Is Change in:
Real Per Capita GDP Growth 0.008 0.024 41 0.110 0.047 43
0.53 0.56 1.28 1.63
Government Spending/GDP 0.033 0.114 31 0.115 0.048 33
1.45 1.47 0.58 0.59
Share of Health and Education -0.038 -0.133 31 0.059 0.024 32
1.01 1.07 0.36 0.38
Tax Revenues/GDP 0.021 0.068 39 0.035 0.017 39
1.02 1.03 0.89 0.92
Aid/GDP -0.116 -0.338 41 -0.204 -0.088 43
1.57 1.95 0.73 0.74
Policy Quality 0.551 1.581 42 -0.029 -0.012 43
1.17 1.32 0.03 0.03
Share of Trade Taxes -0.128 -0.412 39 -0.092 -0.045 39
1.33 1.77 0.98 1.01
Investment/GDP 0.118 0.351 39 0.099 0.044 38
0.97 1.09 0.43 0.43
First-Stage Regression:
(Dependent Variable is debt relief as share of exports)
5-year lag of PV of debt/exports 0.195 0.068 0.040 0.094
2.71 2.91 1.59 2.99
F-Statistic 7.34 8.48 2.52 8.93
# of Observations 42 42 43 43  
Note: Each row of the table corresponds to a regression of the change in the five-year average of 
the indicated variable on cumulative debt relief over previous five-year period. Coefficient 
estimates in bold and absolute value of t-statistics below.   51
 
 
Table 6:  Impact of Changes in Total Debt on Outcomes 
 
Change 1994-1998 Over 1989-1993 Change 1999-2003 Over 1994-1998
OLS # Obs IV # Obs OLS # Obs IV # Obs
Coefficient on Change in PV of Total Debt/Exports in IV
Regression where Dependent Variable
Is Change in:
Real Per Capita GDP Growth 0.010 33 0.004 31 0.011 45 -0.026 36
1.72 0.51 2.17 1.18
Government Spending/GDP -0.013 27 -0.018 25 0.005 37 -0.039 28
1.99 0.75 0.52 0.58
Share of Health and Education -0.017 27 0.011 25 -0.004 36 -0.018 27
1.21 0.33 0.43 0.44
Tax Revenues/GDP -0.003 32 -0.019 31 0.003 34 -0.003 33
0.67 1.47 0.82 0.04
Policy Quality 0.022 33 -0.006 31 -0.034 45 -0.058 36
0.20 0.02 0.35 0.17
Share of Trade Taxes 0.047 32 0.066 31 0.006 34 0.022 33
2.38 1.25 0.42 0.88
Investment/GDP -0.001 31 0.018 29 0.003 39 -0.047 31
0.14 0.93 0.42 0.50
First-Stage Regression:
(Dependent Variable is Change in PV of Total Debt/Exports)
5-year lag of PV of debt/exports -0.431 -0.188
2.88 2.50
F-Statistic 8.27 6.27
# of Observations 31 36  
Note: Each row of the table corresponds to a regression of the change in the five-year average of 
the indicated variable on cumulative debt relief over previous five-year period. Coefficient 
estimates in bold and absolute value of t-statistics below.   52
 
 
Table 7:  Impact of Debt Relief 1999-2003 
 
Coefficient on Debt Relief
Method 1 Method 2 # Obs
Real Per Capita GDP Growth 0.000 0.000 54
0.04 0.38
Government Spending/GDP 0.004 0.001 41
1.63 1.47
Share of Health and Education 0.000 0.000 41
0.09 0.09
Tax Revenues/GDP 0.005 0.003 40
1.06 1.31
Aid/GDP 0.003 0.001 54
1.44 1.13
Policy Quality 0.008 0.004 54
1.42 1.22
Share of Trade Taxes 0.007 0.004 40
1.02 1.56
Investment/GDP -0.002 -0.001 46
1.17 1.31  
Note: Each row of the table corresponds to a regression of the change in the five-year average of 
the indicated variable on cumulative debt relief over previous five-year period. Coefficient 
estimates in bold and absolute value of t-statistics below.   53
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Figure 2:  Present Value of Debt Relief 1989-2003 
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Figure 3:  Debt Relief and Growth 
 
Real Per Capita Growth  
(Change 1994-1998 Over 1989-1993, Method 2 Debt Relief) 
 
Real Per Capita Growth   
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Figure 4:  Debt Relief and Government Spending 
 
Government Spending/GDP 
(Change 1994-1998 Over 1989-1993, Method 2 Debt Relief) 
 
Health and Education Spending/Total Spending 
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Debt Relief as a share of Initial Exports  57
 
 
Figure 5:  Debt Relief, Tax Revenues, and Aid  
 
Total Tax Revenue/GDP 
(Change 1994-1998 over 1989-1993, Method 2 Debt Relief) 
 
Aid/GDP 
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Figure 6:  Debt Relief and Policy Outcomes 
 
Country Policy and Institutional Assessment 
(Change 1994-1998 over 1989-1993 , Method 2 Debt Relief) 
 
Trade Tax Revenue/Total Tax Revenue 
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